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EXCLUSIVE OF WHAT? THE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE
1970 “METLAKATLA”
AMENDMENT TO PL 280
ANDY HARRINGTON*
This Article examines the legal and historical contexts of the 1970
“Metlakatla” amendment to PL 280. This amendment is frequently
relied upon by proponents of a divestiture interpretation of PL
280—an interpretation that PL 280 left the affected Indian Tribes
within mandatory PL 280 states with no residual civil or criminal jurisdiction. The author argues that the conventional reliance upon
that amendment to support a divestiture interpretation is based on
flawed premises and that a more complete analysis of the language,
background, and legislative history materials (both state and federal)
pertaining to the amendment should lead to the conclusion that the
amendment is in fact more consistent with a non-divestiture interpretation.

I. INTRODUCTION
1
Public Law 83-280 (PL 280) was primarily intended to enable
state criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within Indian
country and, secondarily, to open state courthouse doors to civil ac-
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amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
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tions arising from within Indian country. PL 280 has been described as a “complicated statute which has been very controversial . . . often . . . misunderstood and misapplied . . . [with a] practical impact . . . way beyond that which was legally required,
2
At the root of the debate is
intended, and contemplated.”
whether, in conferring jurisdiction on state courts, PL 280 stripped
tribes in Alaska of their jurisdiction.
This divestiture interpretation of PL 280 has been rejected in
3
virtually all jurisdictions. Though it is still occasionally raised in
various courts and has met a friendly reception in Alaska’s state
4
courts, the divestiture interpretation’s continuing vitality in Alaska
is not clear.
Supporters of the divestiture interpretation often cite Public
5
Law 91-523, a 1970 amendment to PL 280’s criminal provision enacted in response to concerns raised by the Metlakatla Indian
6
Community in Alaska (“Metlakatla Amendment”). This Article
reviews the arguments used to link the Metlakatla Amendment to
the divestiture interpretation by focusing on the legislative history
of the amendment and its relation to prior amendments. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the Metlakatla Amendment neither ratified nor codified the divestiture interpretation into PL 280.

2. Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns
for Victims of Crime in Indian Country, http://www.tribal-institute.
org/articles/gardner1.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
3. Office of Tribal Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Concurrent Tribal Authority Under Public Law 83-280 (Nov. 9, 2000), http://www.tribalinstitute.org/lists/concurrent_tribal.htm (“Indian tribes retain concurrent criminal
jurisdiction over Indians in PL 280 states. That is the shared view of the Federal
Government and the vast majority of courts that have directly considered the issue.”).
4. See Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Serv., 722
P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986), overruled in part by In
re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 850 (Alaska 2001).
5. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)).
6. “The nearly unanimous view among tribal courts, state courts, and lower
federal courts, state attorneys general, the Solicitor’s Office for the Department of
the Interior, and legal scholars is that Public Law 280 left the inherent civil and
criminal jurisdictions of Indian nations untouched . . . . The only doubts about
Congress’s intent derive from two 1970 amendments to Public Law 280.”
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 560–61 (2005 ed.) (citations omitted).
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II. THE METLAKATLA AMENDMENT AND THE DIVESTITURE
INTERPRETATION OF PL 280
A. Relevance of the Divestiture Interpretation in Alaska and
Elsewhere
Is any discussion of PL 280 in Alaska necessary? Many might
initially respond in the negative. In 1998, the United States Supreme Court in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govern7
ment held that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
8
(ANCSA) had greatly reduced the acreage which could be consid9
ered Indian country in Alaska. As the Alaska Supreme Court
10
noted the following year in John v. Baker, “P.L. 280, which grants
states jurisdiction over disputes in Indian country, has limited application in Alaska because most Native land will not qualify for
11
the definition of Indian country.” The opinion went on to hold
that PL 280 was, thus, irrelevant to a tribe’s claim to inherent mem12
bership-based jurisdiction outside Indian country.
Yet the debate over PL 280 in Alaska continues between protribal advocates, who favor tribal jurisdiction, and anti-tribal advocates, who press the divestiture interpretation. Many who oppose
tribal court jurisdiction in Alaska state that PL 280 abrogated tribal
jurisdiction both within and outside of Indian country. Most recently, this view was articulated by former Alaska Attorney Gen13
eral Gregg Renkes in October of 2004 when he issued an opinion
taking the position that Native Village of Nenana v. State, Depart14
15
ment of Health & Social Services, even though overruled in part,
still stood for the proposition that PL 280 deprives Alaska Native
Villages of any authority to initiate child protection proceedings in
16
tribal court. The opinion states Alaska’s tribes can only exercise
jurisdiction by (a) petitioning to resume jurisdiction under 25
7. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2000).
9. 522 U.S. at 532.
10. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182 (2000).
11. Id. at 747–48 (Alaska 1999).
12. Id. at 748.
13. Jurisdiction of State and Tribal Courts In Child Protection Matters, 2004
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 1 (Oct. 1, 2004), A.G. file no. 661-04-0467, available at
http://146.63.113.142/pdf/opinions/opinions/661040467.pdf [hereinafter Renkes
Op.].
14. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986), overruled in
part by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 850 (Alaska 2001).
15. In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 850.
16. See Renkes Op., supra note 13, at 7–21.
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U.S.C. § 1918,17 or (b) petitioning to transfer a case from state court
18
under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). By applying the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 to Alaska Native Villages regardless of whether they
occupy Indian country perpetuates the divestiture debate despite
19
the dearth of Indian country in Alaska after ANCSA.
Pro-sovereignty advocates, although in strong disagreement
with the Renkes opinion, would agree that PL 280 still has relevance in Alaska because the Venetie ruling did not completely
20
eliminate Indian country in Alaska. As long as there is some Indian country in Alaska, the question of whether PL 280 was a divestiture statute will remain relevant. The Metlakatla Reservation,
the sole Alaska reservation to have survived ANCSA, is clearly Indian country within even the narrowest interpretation of the statu21
tory definition. Further, the approximately 900,000 acres of re22
stricted Alaska Native allotments and the approximately 3,800
23
Alaska Native townsite lots are strong candidates for Indian coun24
PL 280 therefore has some geographical scope in
try status.
17. Id. at 3, 19. Tribes can petition for either exclusive jurisdiction (as Chevak
and Barrow have done) or for concurrent jurisidiction (as Metlakatla has done).
Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 3, 12–14. The opinion mentions that tribes in non-PL 280 states have
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children under twenty-five years of age residing
on reservations under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) without having to petition for reassumption, but since Alaska is a PL 280 state, this provision will have little or no
application. Id. at 10–12.
19. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629
(2000). The Act revoked reserves set aside for Native use, except for the Annette
Island Reserve inhabited by the Metlakatla Indians. Id. at § 1618(a); accord
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.2 (1998).
20. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 n.2.
21. See id.
22. Alaska Native Allotment Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 270-1 to 270-3, repealed by
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, §18(a), 85 Stat. 688, 710
(1971). The Act allowed pending applications to go through. Id. Also, Natives
who occupied land as their primary residence at the time of the passage of the Act
could apply for up to 160 acres of vacant, unappropriated, unreserved land. Id. §
13(h)(5), 85 Stat. at 705 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h)(5) (2000)).
23. Alaska Native Townsite Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 733–736 (repealed 1976).
24. Some cases have discussed, without ruling, whether Alaska Native allotments are “Indian country.” See Jones v. State, 936 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1997) (State can criminally prosecute for activities occurring on Alaska Native allotment under PL 280 regardless of whether allotment is Indian country);
People of South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Alaska
1979) (municipality cannot tax realty and fixtures on Alaska Native allotments but
can tax personalty, regardless of whether allotments are Indian country). South
Naknek also addressed but did not decide if Native Townsites were Indian coun-
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Alaska, although the exact delineation of that scope may need to
await future court decisions.
PL 280 certainly has application within the other mandatory
PL 280 states and within approximately ten states that have exercised the option PL 280 gave them to extend their jurisdiction into
25
Indian country. The dissent in John v. Baker opined that PL 280
eliminated tribal jurisdiction in areas over which state jurisdiction
26
was extended. If this view were ultimately to prevail, it would
have a profound impact on tribal-state relations in those other
states that have consistently recognized and upheld concurrent
tribal jurisdiction. The dissent was not Alaska-specific: “Congress
therefore chose to define the remaining Indian country in Alaska
covered by P.L. 280 and all Indian country in the other five states,
except for the excepted reservations, as ‘areas over which the sev27
eral States have exclusive jurisdiction.’”
Thus, it is not surprising that the Metlakatla Amendment has
been utilized outside Alaska to resist residual tribal jurisdiction.
For example, the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians had to argue
28
about the Metlakatla Amendment in federal district court in 1998.
The tribe countered in part that the Amendment “was adopted to
resolve a problem unique to Alaska as to the status of Indian coun29
try in that state.” The Cabazon court eventually rejected the divestiture interpretation, concluding that the Band retained its in30
herent criminal jurisdiction notwithstanding PL 280. Still, the case
try. See id. at 877 (municipality cannot tax realty and fixtures on Alaska Native
Townsite lots but can tax personalty, regardless of whether townsite lots are Indian country). For a general discussion of allotments and townsites in Alaska, see
D. CASE & D. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 101–53 (2d ed.,
Univ. of Alaska Press, 2002).
25. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 362–63, n.125 (1982
ed.).
26. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 809 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 810–11 (emphasis added).
28. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
29. Id. at 1198 n.9.
30. Id. at 1200. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment against
the tribe on the separate issue of whether the state could regulate the use of tribal
emergency vehicles with emergency lights while traveling on state highways to get
between non-adjacent areas of the reservation; the court found that California’s
regulations had not been shown to have significantly interfered with the tribal law
enforcement activities. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1201, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 1998). The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming but
then withdrew that opinion and ordered the district court to vacate its judgment
and consider the impact of a 2001 BIA Deputation Agreement. Cabazon Band of
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illustrates two points: first, that the Metlakatla Amendment has fueled legal arguments against tribes outside as well as within Alaska,
and second, that all too often the response from non-Alaskan tribes
has been that the amendment should be regarded as “unique to
Alaska” and, that whatever its meaning, it should not apply to “In31
dian tribes in other designated states.” Any attempt to distinguish
Alaska from other PL 280 states would be erroneous; PL 280 does
32
not treat Alaska differently from other listed “mandatory” states.
For those reasons, notwithstanding the Venetie decision and
the marked diminution of Indian country in Alaska, it is not a completely academic exercise to address the 1970 Metlakatla Amendment in historical context.
B. Case Reliance on the Metlakatla Amendment as Support for
the Divestiture Interpretation
The Metlakatla Amendment had two components: 1) a change
to 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) to list Metlakatla as an “exception” to the
areas of Indian country covered by the statute, and 2) the addition
of the phrase “as areas over which the several states have exclusive
jurisdiction” to subsection (c), which makes two federal criminal
jurisdiction provisions inapplicable within areas of Indian country
33
covered by PL 280.
The Metlakatla Amendment has been cited as supporting the
34
divestiture interpretation in several instances. These arguments
have been based on one or more of three rationales.
Mission Indians v. Smith, 271 F.3d 910, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court
did reconsider but again ruled against the tribe. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
v. Smith, No. CV 97-4687CAS(JGX), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27472, *35 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 17, 2002). The Ninth Circuit then overruled the district court, holding that
the state was “precluded by the preemptive force of federal Indian law from prohibiting the [t]ribe’s use and display of emergency light bars on its police vehicle
when those vehicles were traveling on public roads in performance of the tribal
officers’ law enforcement functions.” Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith,
388 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2004).
31. See Cabazon Band, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 n.9.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000). Both sections simply
list Alaska alongside the five other mandatory states.
33. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)).
34. Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Serv., 722 P.2d
219, 221–22 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986), overruled in part by
In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 850 (Alaska 2001). The court rested its reasoning in
part on the difficulty reconciling the conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1360 left Alaska
Native Villages with concurrent jurisdiction and the subsequent intent of Congress
embodied in explicit legislation to enable the Metlakatla Indian Community to
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The first rationale is that the 1970 amendment was necessary
to give Metlakatla concurrent criminal jurisdiction because PL 280
had removed that jurisdiction. The Nenana court stated: “It is difficult to reconcile that [PL 280 intended that Native councils continue to exercise their jurisdiction concurrently with the state] with
the subsequent intent of Congress embodied in legislation enacted
in 1970 to enable the Metlakatla Indian Community to exercise
35
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.” Justice Matthews, in dissent in
John v. Baker, similarly argued that “[t]his amendment is important because it recognizes that the Metlakatla community lacked
concurrent jurisdiction prior to the amendment. This, in turn,
represents a recognition of pre-amendment exclusive jurisdiction in
36
the state.” Finally, a California district court articulated this point
as follows:
Defendants also argue that the language employed by Congress
when it amended P.L. 280 and extended it to Indian country in
Alaska supports its plain meaning argument, in that Congress
found it necessary to specifically confer concurrent jurisdiction
over criminal matters to the Metlakatla Indian community, because absent such measure, the State of Alaska would have had
exclusive criminal jurisdiction. Defendants argue that this provision in the amendment to P.L. 280 would have been unnecessary
37
if the tribe had preexisting concurrent criminal jurisdiction.

The second rationale is that, because the Interior Department
subscribed to the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 as of 1970,
that interpretation was implicitly adopted by Congress.
Indeed, the Department of the Interior reported to Congress
with respect to the 1970 amendment that P.L. 280, when made
applicable to Alaska, “acted to remove, with limited exceptions,
the civil and criminal jurisdiction for law and order purposes
previously held by the Indian and native groups and the Federal
Government.” The first section of the 1970 amendment thus reflected Congress’s belief that P.L. 280, 38as applied to Alaska,
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the state.

exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction. See also John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738,
808–12 (Alaska 1999) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting). Justice Matthews relied extensively on the difficulty reconciling the explicit Metlakatla exception within the
1970 amendment.
35. Nenana, 722 P.2d at 222 (quoting Governor’s Task Force on FederalState-Tribal Relations [In Alaska], 141–42 (1986) (footnotes omitted)).
36. Baker, 982 P.2d at 810 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting).
37. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 n.9
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
38. Baker, 982 P.2d at 810 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
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The third rationale is that explicit inclusion of the term “exclusive” in subsection (c) constitutes a definitive Congressional pronouncement that state jurisdiction under PL 280 was intended to
be exclusive of any tribal jurisdiction. The dissent in John v. Baker
elaborated:
Section 2 of the 1970 amendment was necessary because under
section 1 Metlakatla remained Indian country covered by P.L.
280. But Congress wanted the Indian community to have concurrent jurisdiction with the state in that area. Congress therefore chose to define the remaining Indian country in Alaska covered by P.L. 280 and all Indian country in the other five states,
except for the excepted reservations, as “areas over which the
several States have exclusive jurisdiction.” This language is
more than merely an expression of Congress’s belief that P.L.
280 granted exclusive jurisdiction to the states; it ratifies that belief. It cannot be dismissed as merely the opinion of a later Congress concerning the meaning of a law passed by an earlier Congress. The later Congress changed the original act’s language to
39
both reflect and enact its belief.

The California district court added that the:
defendants assert that subsection (c) of section 1162, which provides that “sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be
applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection
(a) of this section as areas over which the several states have exclusive jurisdiction, establishes that the states shall have the sole
authority to promulgate and enforce criminal law in those
states.” Defendants argue that if Congress contemplated that
the designated states would have concurrent criminal law jurisdiction with any other sovereign, including Indian tribes, it
40
would not have used the term “exclusive” in subsection (c).

A closer examination of the historical context and legislative
history of that amendment, however, indicates that all three rationales are inaccurate or incomplete. First, the need for corrective
legislation in 1970 was not based on the divestiture interpretation
of PL 280 (in that a suitable remedy for Metlakatla for that particular aspect of the problem had already been enacted by Congress in
1968) but on the need to overturn a 1958 court pronouncement de41
Second, alclaring that the Reserve was not Indian country.
though the June 2, 1970 letter from the Department of the Interior,
written in connection with the House Bill, does reflect adherence
42
to the “divestiture” interpretation, subsequent correspondence

39.
40.
41.
42.
James

Id. at 810–11 (Matthews, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Cabazon Band, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269, 275 (D. Alaska 1958).
Letter from Fred J. Russell, Under Secretary of the Interior, to Hon.
O. Eastland, Chair of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 2,
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from the Interior on November 10, 1970, written in connection with
the Senate Bill which ultimately became law, reflects the opposite.43
Finally, the term “exclusive” in subsection (c) was intended by
Congress to mean exclusive of federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1152 and 1153 and, if interpreted to mean exclusive of tribal jurisdiction, leads to a logical conundrum centered in Metlakatla itself.
III. INDIAN COUNTRY, RESIDUAL JURISDICTION, AND THE
DIVESTITURE INTERPRETATION
A. Indian Country and the Federal Policy Underlying Conferral
of Jurisdiction to State Courts in PL 280
Generally, absent congressional authorization, a state cannot
enforce its criminal laws against the criminal activity of Indians in
44
Indian country located within the state’s territory. Until 1953, the
congressional response to perceived lawlessness within Indian
country had been enactment of statutes creating federal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in federal court. Two such provisions, the
45
46
General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act, are still codified
1970), included with H.R. Rep. No. 91-1545, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783,
4787–88.
43. Letter from Harrison Loesch, Ass’t Secretary of the Interior, to Hon.
Emanuel Celler, Chair, House Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 10, 1970), 116 CONG. REC.
37355 (1970) [hereinafter Loesch Letter].
44. See generally Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368
U.S. 351, 359 (1962).
45. Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (2000)). The General Crimes Act has also been referred to as the “Indian
Country Crimes Act” or the “Inter-Racial Crimes Act” or the “Federal Enclave
Act.” The Act descended from the earliest treaties and provisions of the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts from 1790 forward. The present provision was originally enacted in 1834, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000)). In its current incarnation, it provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
46. Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683, 758 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (2000)). The Major Crimes Act was enacted in response to the decision in Ex
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in the United States Code; in fact, they are the “§§ 1152 and 1153”
of Title 18 referenced in the crucial subsection (c) of the criminal
47
portion of PL 280, and as such they do play a role in the interpretation of the 1970 amendment.
By contrast, in 1953, Congress, again faced with a problem of
lawlessness on certain reservations, took a different approach.
Rather than expanding federal criminal jurisdiction further, Congress, in an early version of an unfunded mandate, called upon the
states to extend the reach of their criminal laws into the Indian
country within their borders. Congress made this criminal law jurisdictional extension mandatory for five states; other states were
48
given the option of extending their jurisdiction. This was PL 280
in a nutshell. It eliminated the barriers to state court jurisdiction—
both criminal and civil—which the boundaries of Indian country
49
otherwise presented.
Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883), which held that
neither the federal nor the territorial courts could try an Indian for on-reservation
murder of another Indian. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973).
The Act created federal jurisdiction to try certain listed major crimes against Indian defendants accused of criminal conduct against Indians. In its current incarnation, the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), reads:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses,
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony
under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16
years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661
of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is
not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such
offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000).
48. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). The
five mandatory states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Alaska was added as a mandatory state by a 1958 amendment. Act of Aug.
8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2000)).
49. PL 280 did not extend state “regulatory” jurisdiction into Indian country.
See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
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Section 2 of the Act set out the “criminal half”50 and section 4
51
set out the “civil half.” Section 7, uncodified, was the “optional”
provision, giving the consent of the United States to any other state
to assume jurisdiction over the Indian country within that state’s
52
borders. This Article focuses on the criminal provision, as that
was the subject of the Metlakatla Amendment.
As enacted, the new criminal provision read:
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to
the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over offenses
committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of
such State shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:
State of Indian country affected
California. . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State.
Minnesota. . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State, except
the Red Lake Reservation.
Nebraska. . . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State.
Oregon. . . . . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State, except
the Warm Springs Reservation.
Wisconsin. . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State, except
the Menominee Reservation.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including
water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band,
or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property
in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of
any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.

50. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)).
51. Id. at § 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
52. Id. at § 7. Section 1 put the new chapter heading into the chapter analysis
for the criminal provision; section 2 contained the text of the new section. Sections 3 and 4 did the same for the civil section. Section 5 repealed a prior narrower 1949 enactment which had given California jurisdiction over the Agua Caliente Indian Reservation. Section 6 gave the consent of the United States to any
state to amend where necessary their constitution to remove any legal impediment
to assumption of jurisdiction.
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(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall
not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in
53
subsection (a) of this section.

One comment with respect to subsections (a) and (c) is pertinent here. Subsection (c) refers to the “areas of Indian country
listed in subsection (a),” but this reference is not without ambiguity, since the tabular structure of subsection (a) in fact contained
two lists of Indian country: one in which criminal jurisdiction was
not being given to the states (the Menominee, Red Lake, and
Warm Springs Reservations), and the other in which criminal jurisdiction was being given to the states (all remaining Indian country
in Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin, and all Indian country in
California and Nebraska). The ambiguity did not present a particularly difficult conundrum, since the intent of subsection (c) was
clear: Congress did not want the theretofore applicable federal
criminal jurisdictional statutes—the General Crimes Act and the
Major Crimes Act—to apply any longer in those areas of Indian
country where the states would now be able to prosecute wrongdoers. These federal criminal jurisdictional statutes would logically
continue to apply within the Menominee, Red Lake, and Warm
Springs Reservations, within which the corresponding states had no
54
criminal jurisdiction under PL 280.
B. Background to the 1958 Addition of Alaska as a PL 280 Jurisdiction
The Territory of Alaska was not included in the original 1953
listing of mandatory PL 280 states. It was not added until 1958 because the issue of the extent to which Alaska contained “Indian
country,” which had flared up shortly after the acquisition of
Alaska by the United States, simmered down and did not arise

53. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000).
54. The Menominee Reservation was stricken from the list in 1954, effectively
moving that Reservation from the “uncovered” list to the “covered” list. Act of
Aug. 24, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-661, 68 Stat. 795 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1360 (2000)). This was a follow-up to the Act of June 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399,
68 Stat. 250, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to terminate federal
supervision over the Menominee Tribe’s property and members. The termination
was not completed by the Secretary until 1961, so Wisconsin had PL 280 jurisdiction from 1954 to 1961. Following passage of the Menominee Restoration Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903–903f (2000)),
Wisconsin and the federal government disputed whether Wisconsin still had PL
280 jurisdiction; the issue was resolved when Wisconsin, utilizing the 1968
amendments to PL 280, discussed infra, retroceded its PL 280 jurisdiction. See
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 362 n.122 (1982 ed.).
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again until 1957. The earliest cases did not consider whether there
might be enclaves of Indian country within Alaska but instead
treated all of Alaska as one unitary area, deciding whether Alaska
as a whole was Indian country or not. The eventual answer was
that Alaska was Indian country for some, but not all, purposes.
The definition of Indian country that was on the books when
Alaska was acquired in 1867 was the one enshrined in the last
Trade and Intercourse Act, from 1837:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi,
and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of
the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act,
55
be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.

Despite the text clearly encompassing Alaska,56 in 1872 the Federal
District Court for the District of Oregon held that Alaska was not
57
“Indian country.” Congress responded four months later by making Alaska Indian country for the purposes of sections 20 and 21 of
58
the Trade and Intercourse Act. The court in 1875 held that this
enactment made Alaska Indian country for purposes of section 23
59
of the Act as well, but it subsequently held that Alaska was not
60
Indian country for purposes of other provisions of the Act. Thus,
when the 1834 definition disappeared from the United States Code
61
as part of the 1874 Revision of Statutes, the answer to the ques-

55. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, 4 Stat. 729.
56. Interpreting this definition, and perhaps reflecting some exasperation at
the inexplicable ruling of the Supreme Court of Oregon in United States v. Tom, 1
Or. 26, 27–28 (Or. 1853) (holding that Oregon was not included in this definition),
Attorney General Caleb Cushing wrote: “Why, I repeat, does not this description
apply to Oregon with mathematical precision of certainty? Is not Oregon a ‘part
of the United States, west of the Mississippi’?” Indians in Oregon, 7 Op. Att’y
Gen. 293, 296 (1855).
57. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872). As to why
the Seveloff ruling chose to eschew Attorney General Cushing’s analysis and follow the 1853 Tom ruling, see generally D. Niedermeyer, The True Interests of a
White Population: The Alaska Indian Country Decisions of Judge Matthew P.
Deady, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 195 (1988).
58. Act of Mar. 8, 1873, 17 Stat. 530.
59. In re Carr, 1 Alaska Fed. 75, 77 (D. Or. 1875).
60. Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas. 411, 411–12 (C.C.D. Or. 1876) (No.
17,264).
61. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 31 (1982 ed.).
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tion of whether Alaska was Indian country was “yes” for some
purposes but “no” for others.62
After 1874, Alaska’s status as Indian country vel non became
less unitary as various reservations were established, starting with
63
the Metlakatla Reservation itself, created by statute in 1891. Numerous reservations of varying sizes were created as reindeer reserves (starting in 1901), executive order reserves (starting in 1905),
public purpose reserves (starting in 1920), and Indian Reorganiza64
tion Act reserves (starting in 1936).
Following the 1874 disappearance of the prior definition of Indian country, a new statutory definition was not forthcoming from
Congress until 1948, by which time the concept of Indian country
had changed through judicial interpretation from a general notion
of lands beyond a frontier to a more enclave-oriented description
65
of lands within specific boundaries in the states and territories. In
1948, Congress encapsulated these court rulings into a new tripartite codification:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term “Indian country,” as used in this chapter, means (a)
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
62. Despite the elimination of the statutory definition from the revision, other
provisions in the Code referring to Indian country necessitated that some definition be utilized. The United States Supreme Court held that resorting to the former 1834 definition was still appropriate and further held that this definition was
to be applied to “all the country to which the Indian title has not been extinguished within the limits of the United States, even when not within a reservation
expressly set apart for the exclusive occupancy of Indians, although much of it has
been acquired since the passage of the act of 1834.” Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca
(Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883). Despite the reference to “acquired since
the passage,” the Alaska courts continued to hold that Alaska was only Indian
country for the specific purposes enumerated by Congress. See, e.g., Kie v. United
States, 27 F. 351, 353 (C.C.D. Or. 1886). As of 1885, these purposes included “section 1955 of the act of July [27], 1868, and sections 20 and 21 of the intercourse act
of 1834, and section 14 of the act of May [17], 1884.” United States v. Nelson, 29
F. 202, 203 (D. Alaska 1886), aff’d, 30 F. 112 (C.C.D. Or. 1887). Nelson held that
section 14 of the 1884 Act had superseded sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 Act
within Alaska, and this apparently defused the issue of for which purposes Alaska
was or was not “Indian country.” Id.
63. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 15, 26 Stat. 1095, 1101 (1891) (formerly codified at 48 U.S.C. § 358).
64. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND
AMERICAN LAWS 65–95 (2d ed. 2002).
65. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 29–33 (1982 ed.).
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within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, in66
cluding rights-of-way running through the same.

The first case to apply this statutory definition in Alaska was decided in 1957 and concluded that the Territory of Alaska could not
prosecute a Native Alaskan for actions committed within the Tyonek Reservation because the reservation met the definition of Indian country and because Congress had not included Alaska within
67
the 1953 enactment of PL 280. In 1958, Congress responded to
this ruling by extending PL 280 to Alaska, adding the “Territory of
68
Alaska” to the list of the original five mandatory PL 280 states.
C. Early History of the Divestiture Interpretation
The current well-established consensus is that PL 280 did not
curtail tribal jurisdiction. However, for the first several years following enactment of the statute, the issue was apparently not litigated at all, or was litigated only minimally, and reported cases
contain little or no discussion of the subject.
Shortly after PL 280’s enactment, a brief letter within the Interior Department indicated that PL 280 had eliminated tribal juris69
diction. That conclusion was uncritically repeated in a 1954 Solici-

66. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (1948) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000)).
67. In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132, 134–35 (D. Alaska 1957).
68. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545. Although Alaska attained statehood shortly afterwards, PL 280 still gave its authority to the “Territory” of Alaska in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 until 1970, and in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 until 1984.
See Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title I, § 110, 98 Stat. 342 (1984).
69. “Although there has been no interpretation of the act of Aug. 15, 1953
(Public Law 280-83d Cong.), by the Federal courts, it is our view that the act, by
providing that the State shall have jurisdiction over crimes and offenses committed by or against Indians in the Indian country to the same extent that the State
has jurisdiction over crimes and offenses committed elsewhere within the State,
except as limited in Section 2(b), made such jurisdiction of the State exclusive.
The extent of the State’s jurisdiction is full and complete and permits of no such
jurisdiction by any other body save the Federal Government and subordinate
agencies of the state itself. The act also explicitly states that the criminal laws
shall have the same force and effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State. The effect of this provision clearly is to extend both the substantive and procedural laws of the State to crimes committed by Indians. Thus, State
law defines not only the criminal offenses against the State and the penalties
therefore, but it also defines the courts in which and the manner in which persons
accused of committing such affenses [sic] are to be tried.” Solic. Mem. Op., 6
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tor’s Opinion70 and in a Memorandum in 1961.71 All three were
72
overruled by a subsequent Solicitor’s Opinion issued in 1978. The
opinion observed of the prior “divestiture” interpretation, “the position seems never to have been the subject of any considered legal
analysis and now appears to be in conflict with principles enunci73
ated in recent decisions of the Supreme Court.” This 1978 Opinion did not represent an abrupt change; prior to 1978, the Interior
Department had issued statements recognizing residual tribal juris74
diction as early as 1976 and had taken actions that implicitly rec-

INDIAN L. REP. H-1, H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978) (quoting Letter from Assistant Secretary
of the Interior Lewis to Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Minneapolis,
Minn. (June 4, 1954)).
70. “It has been concluded that the effect of section 1162 is, among other matters, to repeal whatever power the tribes within that State may otherwise have
possessed to impose their own criminal laws respecting any matter which section
1162 makes subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State.” Solic. Mem. Op. M36241 (Sept. 22, 1954), II Op. of the Solic. of the Dep’t of the Interior Relating to
Indian
Affairs
1917–1974
1649,
1650
(1979),
available
at
http://thorpe.ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1626-1650.html#m-36241 [hereinafter 1954
Opinion]. This September 1954 opinion focuses more on a separate Act passed
simultaneously with PL 280: “An Act to eliminate certain discriminatory legislation against Indians in the United States.” Pub. L. No. 83-277, 67 Stat. 586 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2000)). That Act made the federal Indian liquor laws inapplicable to any act outside Indian country or to any transaction within Indian
country conducted in conformity both with the laws of the State and the tribe.
The Opinion notes that tribes, including tribes within California (a mandatory PL
280 state) have the residual authority to enact alcohol ordinances. It explains that
“the scope of such a tribal ordinance is to be as much within the discretion of the
tribe as the scope of the State liquor laws is to be within the discretion of the
State” but notes that the reasoning of the June 4, 1954, letter means that “while, as
noted above, an Indian tribe in California may by ordinance impose conditions
consistent with the laws of that State upon the sale of liquor within its reservation,
the penalty for violation of such conditions is to be imposed by the United States
pursuant to sections 1154, 1156, and 3618 of Title 18, U.S.C., rather than by any
provision of tribal law.” 1954 Opinion, supra, at 1649–50.
71. Solic. Mem. Op. (Feb. 13, 1961), II Op. of the Solic. of the Dep’t of the Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917–1974 1896 (1979), available at
http://thorpe.ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1876-1900.htm.
72. Solic. Mem. Op. M-36907, 6 INDIAN L. REP. H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978).
73. Id. at H-2.
74. “[T]his office ha[d] already expressed the view that Pub. L. 280 did not divest Indian tribes of their part of the previously-existing concurrent Federal-tribal
jurisdiction but transferred only Federal jurisdiction to the States.” Id. at H-1 (referring to Solic. Mem. Op. (July 13, 1976)).
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ognized residual tribal jurisdiction as far back as 1973.75 In fact,
portions of the Interior Department correspondence with respect
to the Metlakatla Amendment indicate that the Interior had
started to move away from its prior divestiture position as early as
1970.
Since 1978, the other “so-called mandatory Public Law 280
states that have addressed the issue consider state and tribal juris76
diction to be concurrent under Public Law 280.” Examples
abound, with authorities either explicitly holding that PL 280 left
77
states and tribes with concurrent jurisdiction, or deciding cases
78
with that implicit assumption. Cases interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1360
from two mandatory PL 280 states (California and Minnesota)
have reached the Supreme Court. The resulting rulings have indi79
cated that the tribes do have residual authority under PL 280.

75. The Department had certified as far back as 1973 that several tribes in PL
280 states were performing law and order functions for purposes of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197. See id. (referring to 38
Fed. Reg. 13,758–59).
76. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1344 (Wash. 1993).
77. Lemke v. Brooks, 614 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Teague v.
Bad River Band, 612 N.W.2d 709, 716–17 (Wis. 2000); see Walker v. Rushing, 898
F.2d 672, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1990); 70 Op. Wis. Att’y Gen. 237, 1981 WL 157271
(1981); Op. Letter from Robert M. Spire, Att’y Gen., and Charles E. Lowe, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. James E. Goll, Neb. Leg., Op. No. 48 (Mar. 28, 1985), reprinted in 1985 WL 168524 at *2; see also Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944
F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[N]either the Indian Child Welfare Act nor Public
Law 280 prevents [Alaska Native Villages] from exercising concurrent jurisdiction.”).
78. See generally Donahue v. Justice Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971); Zachary v. Wilk, 219 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Oregon v. Surface, 802 P.2d 100 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
79. In Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1360 was to grant states jurisdiction over private
civil litigation involving Indians in state court but not to extend state regulatory
authority into Indian country, and thus the statute did not grant states the power
to tax personal property within Indian country. Similarly, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), the Supreme Court held that
PL 280 did not authorize enforcement of state laws regulating bingo and card
games, since these were regulatory rather than criminal laws. In both cases, it was
clear that the tribes had authority. The Cabazon opinion explicitly mentions that
the bingo games were conducted pursuant to tribal ordinances. 480 U.S. at 204–
05, 207 n.2. In Bryan, although there is no explicit mention that the tribe itself was
imposing a tax, the Court indicated that the tribe could do so, noting a concern
that “general regulatory control [in the states] might relegate tribal governments
to a level below that of counties and municipalities, thus essentially destroying
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The only discordant note among these otherwise harmonious rulings came from the Alaska Supreme Court in the Nenana line of
80
cases, now overruled in part.
However, these developments in the case law all post-date the
1970 Metlakatla Amendment. The conventional wisdom is that, as
of June 1970, the Interior Department was still adhering to its former view that PL 280 had eliminated tribal jurisdiction (although,
as mentioned above, the legislative history of the 1970 Metlakatla
Amendment contains indications that the Department of the Interior was beginning to move away from its prior interpretation as
81
more fully developed infra).
The question thus becomes whether the 1970 amendment,
passed against the backdrop of the now-repudiated Interior Department interpretation, had the effect of concretizing that divestiture interpretation into the statute itself. The answer should be
“no” for reasons elaborated infra.
D. History of the Divestiture Interpretation in Pre-ICWA Alaska
The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted or cited PL 280 in
several cases, but the net result has been that the divestiture interpretation, although not clearly repudiated, has also not been unequivocally adopted. Its earliest pronouncements in the 1970s lean
towards a non-divestiture reading of the statute. The mid-1980s
ushered in several rulings suggesting a divestiture interpretation,
and the overruling of those cases in 2001, while still avoiding a definitive interpretation of PL 280, leaves the question open in
Alaska. The fact that the divestiture interpretation is still possible,
despite having been rejected in virtually all other jurisdictions facing the issue, indicates that the divestiture interpretation has had a
considerably warmer welcome in Alaska than elsewhere.
The first four PL 280 cases decided by the Alaska Supreme
82
Court all came in 1977, and two of them seemed to herald a nonthem, particularly if they might raise revenue only after the tax base had been filtered through many governmental layers of taxation.” 426 U.S. at 388 n.14.
80. See discussion infra Part III.E.
81. The Department of the Interior had previously taken the position, expressed as late as 1970, that PL 280 vested exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the
States. See, e.g., Letter of the Dep’t of Interior on the Metlakatla Amendment, in
H. R. REP. NO. 91-1545 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4784.
82. The Alaska Supreme Court resolved Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 362
P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961) (upholding the state law fish trap ban over the authority of
the Secretary of the Interior to allow fish traps for Native communities), without
reference to PL 280, although the United States Supreme Court cited PL 280 both
in upholding the ruling as to Kake and Angoon, see Organized Vill. of Kake v.
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divestiture interpretation. The first was Ollestead v. Native Village
of Tyonek,83 in which individual tribal members sought a declaratory judgment giving them rights over the area encompassing the
town of Tyonek and shares in the proceeds from certain oil and gas
84
leases. The Ninth Circuit, in Fondahn v. Native Village of Tyonek,
85
had previously ruled that there was no federal court remedy for
86
the dispute. The superior court in Ollestead had relied on Fondahn in ruling that state courts also had no jurisdiction, and that
87
authority to decide such disputes lay solely with the tribe itself.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, though
88
laying out a different jurisdictional assessment. Noting that state
court jurisdiction would arise, if it existed, under PL 280, the court
indicated that 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (the civil half of PL 280) probably would allow Alaska state courts to adjudicate tribal membership disputes in situations where (as in Tyonek) there was no tribal
89
court. However, it refrained from making a definitive ruling on
section 1360(a) because it found the particular dispute in this case
to fall within the prohibition on state jurisdiction under section

Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962), and in reversing the ruling as to Metlakatla, see 369
U.S. 45, 56 (1962).
83. 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977).
84. Id. at 33.
85. 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971).
86. Id. at 522.
87. See Ollestead, 560 P.2d at 32.
88. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit itself had questioned the continued validity of its Fondahn ruling: “It is true that [Fondahn] was
decided in 1971, more than three years after the enactment of the Indian Bill of
Rights on April 11, 1968. But it is also true that the statute was not brought to our
attention, and we did not even purport to decide what its effect upon jurisdiction
might be. Instead, we followed pre 1968 law, adopting and applying the reasoning
of the Tenth Circuit in Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe . . . . The Tenth Circuit has
indicated that Martinez may no longer be good law.” Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
Ultimately, federal court jurisdiction over tribal membership disputes was
found to be lacking, in that only habeas corpus relief would be available in federal
courts. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
89. “The exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over Indian matters in Alaska was
eliminated by a 1958 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) which gave Alaska jurisdiction over ‘civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties’
which arise in areas of Indian country within the then Territory. This provision
suggests that state courts are vested with authority to decide corporate membership disputes among Indians including those involving claims under the Indian Bill
of Rights.” Ollestead, 560 P.2d at 34 (footnotes omitted).
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1360(b).90 In a footnote to its analysis of section 1360(a), the court
noted:
The Supreme Court in Bryan, supra, indicated that “nothing in
(the) legislative history (of 28 U.S.C. § 1360) remotely suggests
that Congress meant the Act’s extension of civil jurisdiction to
the States should result in the undermining or destruction of
such tribal governments as did exist. . . .” In this case, appellants
admit that the Native villages of Alaska, including Tyonek, do
not have a system of laws or tribal courts. Therefore, state assumption of jurisdiction to hear membership disputes
would not
91
interfere with any internal tribal or village affairs.

The implication seemed to be that Tyonek could establish a tribal
court, and that if it did so, then state court adjudication of membership disputes would interfere with tribal affairs and section 1360(a)
would likely not support state assumption of jurisdiction. The entire discussion was dicta because the court concluded that, regardless of whether section 1360(a) allowed state jurisdiction over tribal
membership questions, section 1360(b) precluded state jurisdiction
92
in Tyonek’s case. Nonetheless, the fact that the court apparently
contemplated village jurisdiction in the context of the PL 280
analysis was significant.
The second and third rulings later in 1977 made it clear that issues regarding stock under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
93
Act (“ANSCA”) would not be outside the scope of state jurisdiction. The supreme court first held that state courts did have jurisdiction to put ANCSA corporate stock into the hands of a state
court trustee so that dividends could be used to pay child support
94
obligations. The court then held that state courts could decide the
95
intestate succession of ANCSA stock. Neither opinion expressed

90. “Since, however, we have concluded that § 1360(b) would preclude the
assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1360(a) even if it were applicable, we decline to resolve the question of the extent of the jurisdictional grant found in §
1360(a).” Id.
91. Id. at 34 n.4 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 34.
93. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
1601–1629(h). (2000)).
94. Calista Corp. v. DeYoung, 562 P.2d 338, 343–44 (Alaska 1977).
95. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 57–58 (Alaska 1977). The two rulings
are not entirely consistent in their reasoning. DeYoung indicated that ANCSA
stock was not § 1360(b) property. 562 P.2d at 341. Mann indicated that ANCSA
stock was 1360(b) property, since it was subject to a restriction against alienation
imposed by the United States, but that this only limited the court’s section 1360(a)
jurisdiction and did not affect an independent grant of state court jurisdiction under ANCSA itself. 564 P.2d at 58.
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any view on residual tribal jurisdiction or the divestiture interpretation; however, the intestate succession ruling did recognize traditional cultural adoptions under the customs and traditions of
Alaska Native villages and allowed state courts to give recognition
to such arrangements under the doctrine of “equitable adoption,”
thus indicating the continued vitality of Native laws.
96
Still later in 1977, the court decided Atkinson v. Haldane, ruling that the Metlakatla Indian Community had sovereign immunity
97
Among the several antifrom tort liability in state court.
immunity arguments rejected by the court was an argument that
section 1360, by extending state court jurisdiction within Indian
98
country, had abrogated tribal sovereign immunity. Fitting PL 280
into historical context, noting that several commentators had argued against PL 280 being regarded as full “termination” legislation, and again looking to Bryan for guidance, the court decided
that Congress had not explicitly abrogated sovereign immunity by
enacting PL 280, and that the courts were not free to read that con99
sequence into the law.
Thus, as of the end of 1977, it seemed clear that PL 280 had
not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity, nor had it eliminated Native customs and traditions or the duty of state courts to give legal
cognizance to them. Similarly, the prospect that Alaska Native Villages might set up their own courts to resolve questions (such as
tribal membership issues) was apparently seen by the Alaska Supreme Court as consistent with PL 280, indicating that tribal jurisdiction had not been completely removed.
E. Residual Tribal Jurisdiction under PL 280 in post-ICWA
Alaska
100
Passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978 ushered in a
change in Alaska case law away from issues of protection of tribal
finances as in Ollestead and Atkinson and towards protection of
tribal children.
The non-divestiture view initially seemed to retain its ascendancy in the child protection context in 1986 when the Alaska Su101
preme Court in In re J.M. remanded a case involving an Alaska

96. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
97. Id. at 175.
98. Id. at 163–67.
99. Id.
100. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–
1963 (2000)).
101. 718 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1986).
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Native Child for further proceedings in the Kaltag Tribal Court.102
The child protection case had been initiated in tribal court when
the child’s mother failed to pick up her two-month-old child, J.M.,
103
The
following the child’s two-week hospital stay in Fairbanks.
Kaltag Village Council learned of the situation and issued a written
104
order assuming custody of J.M. At the Council’s direction, J.M.
was released from the hospital and placed in a foster home in Ga105
A few weeks later, the Kaltag Village Chief contacted a
lena.
state social worker to request state foster care payments for the
106
The social worker responded that foster care payments
child.
would only be provided if the child were in state foster care, and
the chief told the social worker to do what was necessary to estab107
lish the child’s right to the payments. The Chief later sent a letter
specifying that the child should “remain in the custody of the
108
State.” The social worker initiated a state court child protection
109
When the state court case
case, in which Kaltag intervened.
moved in the direction of termination of parental rights, Kaltag objected and claimed exclusive jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. §
110
The state trial court ruled against Kaltag’s motion to
1911(a).
dismiss, finding that Kaltag had relinquished custody of J.M. to the
111
State of Alaska and was estopped from claiming otherwise. The
state court then terminated the mother’s rights, and the tribe, as
112
The Department of Health and
well as the mother, appealed.
Social Services, resisting the re-transfer back to tribal court, did not
dispute that J.M. was a ward of a tribal court or that Kaltag had ex-

102. Id. at 156.
103. Id. at 151.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 151–52.
110. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) reads:
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an
Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000). Kaltag relied on the second sentence of this provision
for its exclusive jurisdiction argument, as the child had been made a ward of the
tribal court prior to state court action. J.M., 718 P.2d at 152.
111. J.M., 718 P.2d at 152.
112. Id.
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clusive jurisdiction under section 1911(a), but argued that Kaltag
had waived its jurisdiction by releasing custody of J.M. to the
113
The court noted, “Although we are not asked to decide
State.
whether Kaltag is an ‘Indian tribe’ or whether the Village Council
is a ‘tribal court’ within the meaning of the ICWA, we will describe
the legal bases on which Kaltag relies to justify these conclusions,”
114
Ultimately ruling that the Chief’s acand proceeded to do so.
tions had not been a sufficiently explicit waiver to divest the tribe
of jurisdiction, the court remanded the case for further proceedings
115
in the Kaltag Tribal Court.
A few weeks later, however, the Alaska Supreme Court issued
an opinion which came the closest that court has come to adopting
the divestiture interpretation. Native Village of Nenana v. State
116
Department of Health and Social Services involved a child protection case that started in state court rather than tribal court, and the
state court denied the motion of the Village to have the case trans117
ferred to the tribe under ICWA section 1911(b). The Alaska Su118
preme Court upheld this, reading ICWA section 1918(a) as requiring the Village to obtain approval by the Secretary of the
Interior for a petition for re-assumption of jurisdiction before it
119
The
could require transfer of the case under section 1911(b).
court noted:

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154–55.
722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986).
Id. at 220. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) reads:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or
residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court,
in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either
parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or
the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject
to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)(2000).
118. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) reads:
Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as
amended by title IV of the Act of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or
pursuant to any other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, such tribe shall
present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction.
25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (2000).
119. Native Vill. of Nenana, 722 P.2d at 221.
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Our reading of 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a), indicates that Congress intended that Public Law 280 give certain states, including Alaska,
exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the custody of Indian children, and that those states exercise such jurisdiction until a particular tribe petitions to reassume jurisdiction over such
matters, and the Secretary of the Interior approves tribe’s [sic]
petition.
Although some commentators have concluded that Public Law
280 does not create exclusive state jurisdiction . . . we see no explanation for the mention of Public Law 280 in section 1918(a)
120
unless it required reassumption.

Nenana was a definitive interpretation of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911 and
1918 but not necessarily a definitive interpretation of PL 280. The
opinion goes on to say:
Regardless of whether Public Law 280 vests exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in the applicable states, prior to the Child Welfare Act, Indian tribes may not have had jurisdiction over custody proceedings in a section 1911(b) situation, i.e., where the
child was domiciled off the reservation . . . . The referral jurisdiction provision may actually grant
Indian tribes greater authority
121
than they had prior to the Act.

Thus, the court had two alternate routes to the same conclusion:
one interpreted ICWA and PL 280, the other interpreted ICWA
without PL 280. The court concluded that a section 1911(b) transfer required a section 1918 petition and could be reached
“[r]egardless of whether Public Law 280 vests exclusive or concur122
rent jurisdiction in the applicable states.” As a result, it is not accurate to state that Nenana “held” that PL 280 had vested exclusive
123
jurisdiction in the state courts.

120. Id. (internal citation omitted).
121. Id. (internal citation omitted).
122. Id.
123. The court may have thought at the time that ICWA mandatory transfer
jurisdiction might be greater than general inherent tribal jurisdiction because general inherent jurisdiction could not encompass off-reservation children whereas
ICWA mandatory transfer jurisdiction could, but this view was not rejected until
thirteen years later in John v. Baker. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska
1999) (tribes have inherent jurisdiction over domestic relations of tribal members,
including child custody, regardless of whether they occupy Indian country). Alternatively, the court may have thought that the authority to mandate a transfer of
an already-existing state court case was a greater authority than tribal courts
would have under a general state/tribal concurrent jurisdiction pattern under
which the first case filed in time would generally be allowed to be completed
without interference from the other jurisdiction. This latter view was noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska. 944 F.2d 548,
561 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Likewise, referral jurisdiction is broader in scope than con-
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The court twice in subsequent years declined to overrule Nenana, first in 1987 in In re K.E.,124 in which the court adhered to
125
126
Nenana with minimal discussion, and again in 1992 in In re F.P.,
in which there was substantial discussion of the intervening 1991
127
The Ninth
Ninth Circuit decision in the Venetie adoption case.
Circuit had ruled that, were the Native Villages of Fort Yukon and
Venetie found to be the modern-day successors to historical villages, then they would have authority to grant tribal adoptions, ef128
fectively rejecting the divestiture view of PL 280. But the Alaska
Supreme Court in F.P. was not persuaded that the Venetie adop129
tion holding required it to overrule Nenana. In F.P., the court
noted that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that Venetie and Fort
Yukon might be sovereign if they were the modern-day successors
to historical tribes was inconsistent with a 1988 Alaska Supreme
Court ruling in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management &
130
Planning. In Stevens, the court had undertaken a survey of federal tribal relations in Alaska and concluded that, with the sole exception of Metlakatla, there were no federally recognized tribes in
131
Alaska.
F.P. represented the nadir of judicial rulings on state/tribal authority; the court indicated that PL 280 had removed tribal authority and that there had never been any tribes in Alaska from which
132
such authority could be removed. This makes it even less appocurrent jurisdiction, in that referral jurisdiction is concurrent but presumptively
tribal jurisdiction.”).
124. 744 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1987).
125. Id. at 1174.
126. 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992).
127. Id. at 1215–16.
128. See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council, 944 F.2d at 558–59. The supposed conflict between the Venetie and Nenana rulings was not as great as it appeared. If one read Nenana as having relied primarily on its construction of sections 1918 and 1911(b) and read Venetie as having ruled that PL 280 did not
abrogate concurrent tribal jurisdiction, while acknowledging the possibility that a
petition to re-assume under section 1918 might be required for either section
1911(a) exclusive jurisdiction or section 1911(b) mandatory transfer jurisdiction,
the two rulings were in fact harmonious.
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether § 1911(b) transfers would require a
section 1918 petition; no transfer issues were presented since the adoptions had
been initiated and completed before the Tribal Councils, with no state court case
brought. See id. at 550–51.
129. 843 P.2d at 1215.
130. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).
131. Id. at 34–36.
132. See F.P., 843 P.2d at 1215.
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site authority for the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 than Nenana and K.E. before it. If there were no federally recognized
tribes in Alaska, then there was no basis for inherent tribal jurisdiction regardless of whether the divestiture interpretation of PL 280
was correct or not.
The Alaska Supreme Court next took up the PL 280 issue in
133
John v. Baker. By that point, intervening pronouncements by all
three branches of the federal government had changed the landscape.
First, the Department of the Interior conducted its own survey
of the history of federal-tribal relations in Alaska and reached a
conclusion opposite to that of the Alaska Supreme Court in Ste134
vens. The “Sansonetti opinion,” issued in the last days of George
H. W. Bush’s administration, concluded that there were federally
recognized tribes in Alaska (although specification of which Alaska
135
communities qualified was left for another day). However, their
authority over territory and over non-members was limited because ANCSA lands would not meet the definition of “Indian
136
country.” The specification of tribes was supplied later that year
in October, when the Department of the Interior issued its definitive list of federally recognized tribes in Alaska, with a preamble
making it clear that the listed villages were tribes with the same
137
status as tribes in the lower 48 states.

133. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
134. Id. at 749.
135. Solic. Mem. Op. M-36975 (Jan. 11, 1993) at 131 (on file with author) [hereinafter Sansonetti Opinion].
136. Id.
137. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,365–66 (Oct. 21,
1993) [hereinafter 1993 List]:
The purpose of the current publication is to publish an Alaska list of entities conforming to the intent of 25 CFR 83.6(b) and to eliminate any
doubt as to the Department’s intention by expressly and unequivocally
acknowledging that the Department has determined that the villages and
regional tribes listed below are distinctly Native communities and have
the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states. Such acknowledgement of tribal existence by the Department is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits from the Federal Government available to
Indian tribes. This list is published to clarify that the villages and regional tribes listed below are not simply eligible for services, or recognized as tribes for certain narrow purposes. Rather, they have the same
governmental status as other federally acknowledged Indian tribes by
virtue of their status as Indian tribes with a government-to-government
relationship with the United States; are entitled to the same protection,
immunities, privileges as other acknowledged tribes; have the right, subject to principles of Federal Indian law, to exercise the same inherent and
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Second, Congress followed up in 1994 with legislative changes
that explicitly ratified the Secretary’s authority to issue the list and
138
added one Alaska tribe that the Secretary had omitted.
Third, in 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued an
opinion which vindicated Solicitor Sansonetti’s view that ANCSA
lands were not “Indian country,” thus taking 45 million acres, the
vast majority of Native lands in Alaska, out from under that statu139
tory definition.
John v. Baker provided the Alaska Supreme Court with its
140
first opportunity to revisit PL 280 in light of these developments.
The effect of the Department of the Interior’s list and the congressional ratification thereof was found by the Alaska Supreme Court
141
to be definitive on the tribal recognition issue. As to PL 280, the
court noted that, in the absence of any showing that the case arose
within, or that the Native Village of Northway occupied, Indian
142
country, there was no need to interpret PL 280. Outside Indian
country, Alaska Native Villages could exercise their inherent jurisdiction over the internal domestic relations of tribal members or
those eligible for tribal membership, and that constituted a sufficient basis for the jurisdiction of the Native Village of Northway in
143
that case. There was also no need to consider whether to overrule Nenana’s interpretation of ICWA, since John v. Baker involved an interparental custody dispute rather than a child protection case and was thus outside the definition of “child custody
144
The federal government, in an amicus
proceeding” in ICWA.
brief, unsuccessfully urged the Alaska Supreme Court to reject the
divestiture interpretation of PL 280:
The United States argues that our prior interpretation of P.L.
280 remains relevant even if Northway Village does not occupy
Indian country because it would be contrary to established law
to conclude that a tribal court had greater powers outside, rather

delegated authorities available to other tribes; and are subject to the
same limitations imposed by law on other tribes.
138. Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-454,
108 Stat. 4791 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a, 479a-1 (2000) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1212–
15 (2000)).
139. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 524, 527
(1998).
140. Actually, the tribal recognition issue had been raised in Hernandez v.
Lambert, 951 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1998), but the court chose not to address it, finding
independent state grounds on which to rule. Id. at 439 n.4, 441 n.10.
141. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 749 (Alaska 1999).
142. Id. at 748.
143. See id. at 759–61.
144. Id. at 746–47.
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than inside, of Indian country. It is true that, generally, Indian
nations possess greater powers in Indian country than they do
outside it. . . . And at least one federal reservation does still exist
in Alaska. Thus, the United States correctly notes in its brief
that the recognition of Northway’s jurisdiction creates a disjunction in Indian law jurisprudence. But this inconsistency does not
create a145justification to address issues that are not squarely before us.

Thus, in the wake of John v. Baker, the non-recognition analysis of Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management and Plan146
147
ning was effectively superseded. Nenana, however, was still
good law, such that section 1911(b) transfers would still require
148
Secretarial petitions in state court. As to the divestiture interpretation of PL 280, the ambiguous pronouncements in Nenana about
whether its conclusions on section 1911(b) transfers were premised
upon or “regardless of” PL 280 still had whatever validity they pre149
The geographical scope of PL 280 was, however,
viously had.
greatly reduced, by the recognition in John v. Baker that PL 280
had no application outside the now-narrowed bounds of Indian
country in Alaska under the Supreme Court’s 1998 Venetie tax case
150
ruling.
The validity of Nenana, although not before the court in John
151
v. Baker, was squarely before the court two years later in C.R.H.,
in which the court overruled Nenana and held that section 1918 reassumption petitions were not necessary before a state court could
transfer a child protection case to tribal court under ICWA section
152
1911(b). A definitive ruling on the divestiture interpretation of
PL 280, however, was still not forthcoming:

145. Id. at 748 n.46 (citation omitted).
146. See In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Alaska 1992).
147. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986).
148. See John, 982 P.2d at 748.
149. Id. The court did characterize the rulings in Nenana (“[W]e interpreted §
1918(a)’s reassumption requirement to mean that PL 280 had vested exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters in state courts, and that the state exercised
exclusive jurisdiction until a particular tribe successfully petitioned the Secretary
of the Interior”) and F.P. (“[W]e reiterated our view that P.L. 280 had granted the
states exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters, quoting from the portion
of Nenana that interpreted ICWA’s § 1918(a). . . . In sum, our decisions to limit
tribal adjudicatory power in Nenana and F.P. turned on our interpretation and
application of ICWA and PL 280”), id. at 745–46, thus tying Nenana more strongly
to PL 280 than Nenana itself had.
150. Id. at 748.
151. In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001).
152. Id. at 852.
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Nikolai urges us to reconsider Nenana’s interpretation of P.L.
280, and to hold that the Alaska Native tribes affected by P.L.
280 retain jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state. We
need not reach this issue, however, because the jurisdiction
claimed by Nikolai exists regardless of P.L. 280: Subsection
1911(b) tribal transfer jurisdiction over ICWA custody cases was
expressly approved by Congress in enacting ICWA. The language and structure of section 1911 reflect congressional intent
that all tribes, regardless of their P.L. 280 status, be able to accept transfer jurisdiction of ICWA cases from state courts. We
therefore hold that Nikolai may assume jurisdiction over this
case under ICWA’s subsection 1911(b) transfer provision. To
the extent that Nenana, F.P., and K.E.
are inconsistent with this
153
decision, those cases are overruled.

With the divestiture interpretation soundly rejected by decisions from the other mandatory PL 280 jurisdictions and with Nenana, the only opinion containing language favoring the divestiture
interpretation having been overruled in part, it would seem that
there was no remaining precedent supporting the divestiture interpretation in Alaska. Nenana had originally reached its conclusion
“regardless” of whether PL 280 stripped tribes of concurrent jurisdiction. To the extent that John v. Baker and C.R.H. both may
have characterized the holding of Nenana as having been an inter154
pretation of PL 280 rather than an interpretation of ICWA section 1918 “regardless” of PL 280, it is far from clear that either
opinion could, or was meant to, give Nenana a broader scope than
the language of Nenana would support. With both standing for the
proposition that PL 280 was irrelevant without a showing of Indian
country, any interpretation that Nenana could have given to PL 280
is even less cogent, in light of the fact that Nenana makes no mention of the case having arisen within “Indian country.”
The October 2004 opinion from the Alaska Attorney General
purports to find much more remaining vitality in the overruled Ne-

153. Id. As in John v. Baker, the C.R.H. opinion characterized Nenana as having interpreted PL 280:
This court interpreted P.L. 280 in Native Village of Nenana, holding that
through that law Congress effectively divested tribal jurisdiction and
granted the state ‘exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the custody of Indian children.’ State jurisdiction remained exclusive, we held,
unless a tribe governed by P.L. 280 successfully petitioned to reassume
custody under ICWA section 1918.
Id. at 851–52. However, the court also noted that Nenana had based its analysis
primarily on the language of ICWA section 1918. Id. at 852 n.13.
154. See supra notes 123 and 128 and accompanying text.
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nana line of cases than has any other court or commentator.155 It
gives a broad reading to Nenana, beyond the section 1911(b) transfer question actually at issue in that case, and it gives a broad divestiture application to PL 280, apparently both inside and outside Indian country, despite the contrary pronouncements in John v.
156
Baker and C.R.H. It also concludes that no Alaska Native Village has any jurisdiction over ICWA child custody proceedings
aside from Metlakatla (because it has a reservation) and the two
villages (Barrow and Chevak) which have had their petitions to re157
assume exclusive jurisdiction granted by the Interior Department.
It is not clear the extent to which this view will hold any weight
with the courts, but it is clearly the current position of Alaska’s Executive Branch.
IV. HISTORY OF THE METLAKATLA AMENDMENT
A. PL 280 and the Metlakatla Reservation
The Metlakatla Reservation was established statutorily in
158
1891, somewhat incongruously, only four years after Congress
had enacted the landmark anti-reservation pro-assimilation Dawes
159
General Allotment Act in 1887. Eighty years later, the Metlakatlans again bucked the trend of history, becoming the only Alaskan
tribe whose reservation was not revoked by the Alaska Native
160
As a result, Metlakatla is the one land
Claims Settlement Act.
area within Alaska whose status as Indian country is unquestioned
today.
In between those two bookends, however, Metlakatla’s status
as Indian country came into question.
A few months after the 1957 McCord decision that the Tyonek
161
reservation was “Indian country,” Martin Reggie Booth of Metlakatla was charged with driving under the influence and assault

155. See Jurisdiction of State and Tribal Courts in Child Protection Matters,
A.G. file no 661-04-0467, 2004 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 1, http://146.63.113.142/
pdf/opinions/opinions/661040467.pdf.
156. See id. at 7–8, 11–12.
157. Id. at 19–20; 58 Fed. Reg. 11,766 (Feb. 26, 1993) (as corrected at 58 Fed.
Reg. 16,448 (Mar. 26, 1993)) (Metlakatla re-assuming concurrent jurisdiction); 64
Fed. Reg. 36,391 (July 6, 1999) (Barrow and Chevak re-assuming exclusive jurisdiction).
158. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 25 Stat. 1101.
159. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
160. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (2000).
161. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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and battery.162 His attorney filed a motion challenging the court’s
jurisdiction in reliance on the McCord decision, arguing that Met163
lakatla was Indian country as well. Before that motion could be
164
decided, a plea bargain was apparently arranged; the assault
charge was dismissed, and Booth pled guilty to the DUI charge in
165
April 1958. Four days after the guilty plea was entered, the court
issued what seems to have been a clearly advisory opinion because
“the [g]overnment, as well as the [c]ourt, felt it was necessary to go
fully into the question of the [c]ourt’s jurisdiction in this case, as
well as in violations of territorial law committed in the community
166
The Assistant United States Attorney
of Metlakatla, Alaska.”
filed a “most exhaustive brief” and “because of the excellence of
this brief, the [c]ourt adopt[ed] the same, with a few additions and
appropriate rewording,” concluding that Metlakatla was not Indian
167
country and thus McCord would not preclude criminal prosecu168
tions in Metlakatla. Four months later, Congress added the Territory of Alaska to PL 280, such that McCord would not preclude
169
criminal prosecutions anywhere in Alaska.
Since 1958, this anomalous Booth ruling that Metlakatla did
not occupy Indian country has been effectively superseded. As
noted above, by enacting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
170
(“ANCSA”), in 1971. Congress specifically excepted Metlakatla
from ANCSA, such that its reservation was not revoked and its
citizens not authorized to participate in the land and cash elements
171
of the Act. In 1976, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that
Metlakatla enjoyed sovereign immunity based in part on its reser172
And in 1998, the United States Supreme Court
vation status.
162. United States v. Booth, 161 F.Supp. 269, 270 (D. Alaska 1958).
163. See id.; see also In re McCord, 151 F.Supp.132 (D. Alaska 1957).
164. Booth, 161 F. Supp. at 270.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 275.
169. Compare United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alaska 1958)
(dated Apr. 25, 1958) with Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545
(dated Aug. 8, 1958).
170. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
1601–1629(h) (2000)).
171. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (2000).
172. See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 156 (Alaska 1976). In subsequent
decisions where the Alaska Supreme Court called into question the sovereign immunity of all other Alaska Native Villages, it was careful to carve out an exception
for Metlakatla. See Native Vill. of Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. and Planning, 757
P.2d 32, 34–35 (Alaska 1988). The reasoning in Native Village of Stevens on the
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seemed to cement Metlakatla’s status as Indian country in its Venetie opinion.173
Nevertheless, as of 1970 when Congress was considering the
Metlakatla Amendment to PL 280, the Booth case had not yet
been superseded. A 1961 decision from the United States Supreme
174
Court in Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan had cited Booth
uncritically in the course of ruling that, because of Metlakatla’s
reservation, the permission of the Secretary of the Interior for the
Metlakatlans to use fish traps would override the State law prohibi175
Although this ruling in some respects
tion against such traps.
bolstered Metlakatla’s status as a reservation, it did not deal directly with Metlakatla’s status as “Indian country,” and the fact
that the opinion apparently relied in part on Booth implied that it
saw nothing inconsistent in allowing Booth to remain good law.
The Booth ruling, issued about four months before PL 280 was extended to Alaska in August 1958, was to have significant implications for the 1970 amendment.
Metlakatla had been in the habit of enforcing its tribal criminal laws for years prior to 1958, and apparently it continued doing
176
so for years after 1958. It does not appear that after 1958 either
the state or the federal government interfered at all with Met177
lakatla’s enforcement of its tribal criminal laws, at least initially.
Metlakatla was completely unaware that anyone thought it had lost
178
its tribal criminal jurisdiction until some point in the mid-1960s,

non-immunity of Alaska Native Villages has been effectively superseded by the
opinion in Runyon v. Ass’n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 438–39
(Alaska 2004) (“Each of AVCP’s member tribes is therefore protected by tribal
sovereign immunity.”).
173. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.2
(1998).
174. 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
175. Id. at 51–52, 57–58. By contrast, in the companion case of Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), the state prohibition overrode the Secretarial authorization in the villages of Kake and Angoon, which did not have reservations. Kake, 369 U.S. at 62.
176. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1545 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4784.
The Metlakatlans created a model community. . . . They set up rules for
the election of a mayor and council. They arranged for their own community to furnish governmental services, including education. . . . They
also enforced law and order as far as misdemeanor offenses were concerned. Major offenses were the responsibility of the Federal Government.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 4785.
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when the community set about trying to have the loss of jurisdiction addressed.
This led Metlakatla to support an effort that had started in the
early 1960s to enact a major amendment to PL 280. The following
section tracks that effort and its ultimate outcome.
B. Metlakatla and the Indian Civil Rights Act
The effort to amend PL 280 was spearheaded by the Senate’s
Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by the
redoubtable Senator Sam Ervin Jr. of North Carolina.
Starting in 1961 and concluding in March, 1963, the subcommittee held exploratory hearings in nine states, with eighty-five
179
Since the Federal Constitution
tribal representatives testifying.
had no application to tribal governments, the subcommittee’s main
concern had been that individuals had no constitutional protections
180
As the hearings proagainst excesses by such governments.
gressed, however, the committee reached the conclusion that the
lack of constitutional protections was only part of the problem, and
that PL 280 had resulted in a breakdown in the administration of
justice to such a degree that Indians were being denied due process
181
and equal protection of the law.
Nine legislative proposals encompassing the subcommittee’s
suggestions were introduced by Senator Ervin in the closing days of
182
the 88th Congress in July 1964, and the same nine were introduced again in the early days of the 89th Congress in February
183
1965. One of the bills—numbered S. 966 in the 89th Congress—
proposed to revoke section 7 (the “optional” section) of the origi184
nal PL 280 with a proviso that any already-existing cession of jurisdiction from the United States to a particular state would not be

Strangely enough, neither the territorial nor the Federal Government notified Metlakatla after enactment of the new statute to inform the community that its court and police had lost their authority to function. In the
midsixties [sic], when this fact became known, the community discontinued its practice of employing a magistrate and police.
179. 110 CONG. REC. 17326 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin); S. REP. NO. 891553, at 6 (1966).
180. S. REP. NO. 89-1553, at 6–7.
181. Id. at 8–9.
182. See 110 CONG. REC. 17326 (July 29, 1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin); S.
3043, 88th Cong. (1964) (addressing PL 280).
183. See 111 CONG. REC. 1799 (Feb. 2, 1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin); see also
S. 966, 89th Cong. (1965) (addressing PL 280).
184. Section 7 dealt with assertion of jurisdiction by “optional” PL 280 states.
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280 §7, 67 Stat. 588 (not codified).
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affected.185 Future extensions of PL 280 jurisdiction by a state
would still be possible, but only with the consent of the affected
tribe. The bill also included a provision under which a state could
retrocede any jurisdiction it had obtained under either the civil section or the criminal section of PL 280, or under the “optional” sec186
tion 7.
Hearings were held during the 89th Congress in June 1965,
which indicated that S. 966 was the most popular of the set of bills:
Senate Bill 966 drew from Indians or their representatives more
support than was given to any of the other bills before the subcommittee. With few exceptions, the experiences of Indian
tribes under State jurisdiction, as provided for in Public Law 280,
was said to be almost wholly unsatisfactory.
Other groups or individuals stated similar views. Not all witnesses were critical of State jurisdiction, to be sure, but it is significant to note that in those instances which satisfaction with
State jurisdiction was indicated, the assumption of that jurisdiction followed State consultation with or consent of the tribes
concerned.
Not everyone who favored S. 966 was wholly in accord with the
present version of the bill. The most frequently proposed
change was one providing for piecemeal187or partial extension of
State jurisdiction to the reservation area.

Although S. 966 did not pass during the 89th Congress, a similar
package (slimmed down somewhat by the elimination of two of the
prior bills and consolidation of two others, leaving five bills and
one joint resolution) was introduced in the 90th Congress in May
188
This bill, S. 1845, contained the PL 280 amendment that
1967.
had been in S. 966 the previous session.
The fate of S. 1845 and its companion Indian Civil Rights bills
became entwined with that of another bill, H.R. 2516, a controversial general civil rights bill which the House passed and conveyed
to the Senate in August 1967. Senator Ervin was determined to
have the Indian Civil Rights provisions of S. 1845 and its companions inserted into H.R. 2516. Under his chairmanship, the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, on October 12, 1967, approved an amended H.R. 2516 (which differed substantially from
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. S. Rep. No. 89-1553, at 13 (1966). The Report also notes that another
question arose as to how consent of the Indian people would be obtained, and that
the bill would have to be amended in order to provide the necessary machinery
for determining this consent or lack thereof.
188. S. 1843–1847, 90th Cong. (1967). S.J. Res. 87, 90th Cong (1967). S. 1845
essentially contained the same provisions as S. 966 in the 89th Congress.

01__HARRINGTON.DOC

2006]

6/5/2006 3:59 PM

METLAKATLA AMENDMENT

35

the version passed by the House), and inserted the Indian Civil
Rights provisions, including the PL 280 changes. However, the full
Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the subcommittee’s amendment on October 25, 1967, reverting to language similar to that
189
which the House had originally passed.
While the controversy over H.R. 2516 made its way toward the
Senate floor, the Senate Judiciary Committee took up the narrower
S. 1845 and its companions, condensed them into a single bill (S.
190
1843) and issued a favorable report on December 6, 1967. Senate
Bill 1843 passed on December 7, and included the amendment to
191
PL 280.
In the meantime, H.R. 2516, without Senator Ervin’s language,
proved to be a tremendously controversial and time-consuming bill
on the floor of the Senate in early 1968. As the bill labored its way
through extended debate and repeated attempts at cloture votes,
Senator Ervin eventually succeeded on the Senate floor where he
192
Thus, the Indian
had failed before the Judiciary Committee.
Civil Rights provisions of S. 1843, including the changes to PL 280,
193
With that amendment inwere incorporated into H.R. 2516.
194
cluded, H.R. 2516 passed the Senate and went back to the House,
195
which agreed to the Senate’s changes. On April 11, 1968, H.R.
2516 became Public Law 90-284, Title IV of which contained the
amendments to PL 280, albeit with most of its legislative history at196
tached to a separate, un-enacted bill.
Metlakatla followed these developments with interest; the
Congressional Record contains a letter from John W. Smith, Acting Mayor of the Metlakatla Indian Community, stating, “We are
on record to fully support Senator Sam J. Ervin’s Indian rights bill
as an amendment to H.R. 2516 when the civil rights measure comes
before the Senate. We especially want to amend law 280 to clear
197
up jurisdiction on our tribal land.”

189. S. Rep. No. 90-721 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1838,
1848, 1854, 1863.
190. See generally S. Rep. No. 90-841 (1967).
191. 113 CONG. REC. 35473 (Dec. 7, 1967).
192. See 114 CONG. REC. 5838 (Mar. 8, 1968).
193. See id.
194. 114 CONG. REC. 5992 (Mar. 11, 1968).
195. 114 CONG. REC. 9553, 9621 (Apr. 10, 1968).
196. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).
197. 113 CONG. REC. 35,475 (Dec. 7, 1967). The letter is undated but was
probably written in November 1967, like the other letters with which it appears. It
is included with materials in the Congressional Record accompanying passage of
S. 1843 by the Senate in December 1967.
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Metlakatla’s optimism that H.R. 2516 (which later became
Public Law 90-284) would clear up its jurisdiction problems was
logical. The 1968 amendments “reflected the shift in national policy toward Indians, from an assimilationist approach, to a policy
198
Although
promoting tribal self-governance and self-reliance.”
they did not answer the question of whether PL 280 in 1953 had divested tribes of their jurisdiction, the 1968 amendments made that
question less important, at least in situations where the affected
tribe and the State were in agreement as to the division of jurisdictional responsibility between them, as was the case between Met199
lakatla and Alaska. After the 1968 amendments, a tribe and state
which were in agreement as to the division of jurisdictional responsibility between them within the tribe’s Indian country could implement that agreement without need for further federal legislation. If the State had too much jurisdiction, it could retrocede; if
the State had too little, it could extend its jurisdiction, with the con200
sent of the Tribe.
So what prohibited Metlakatla and the State of Alaska after
1968 from implementing their agreement without going back to
Congress? The answer requires a closer reading of state legislative
materials.
C. Metlakatla and the State Retrocession Bill
Metlakatla and the State of Alaska did in fact try to utilize the
1968 amendment to PL 280 to re-vest jurisdiction in the Tribe, and
in 1969, came very close to doing so.
Senator Robert Ziegler of Ketchikan, on March 14, 1969, introduced Senate Bill 266, “[a]n Act relating to criminal jurisdiction

198. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1990).
199. If PL 280 did strip the tribes of jurisdiction, then retrocession to the
United States would return jurisdiction to the tribe. See, e.g., Umatilla Indian
Reservation; Oregon’s Acceptance of Retrocession of Jurisdiction, 46 Fed. Reg.
2195 (Jan. 8, 1981) (“Through retrocession to the United States, criminal jurisdiction will return to the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla India Reservation.”).
If PL 280 left tribal jurisdiction intact, then of course the tribe would have never
lost it in the first place.
200. Simultaneously, other portions of the Indian Civil Rights Act limited tribal
court sentencing authority to six months, and fines to $500. Act of Apr. 11, 1968,
Pub. L. No.. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968). The limitation was later enlarged to
one year and $5,000. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (2000)). Thus, tribal court authority was effectively limited to misdemeanor-level crimes.
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on the Annette Island.”201 As introduced, the bill added a new section 12.05.012 to the Alaska Statutes, which read:
Jurisdiction of Annette Islands:
Subject to acceptance by the United States, as provided in Section 403 of the Act of Congress of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79, 25
U.S.C. Sec. 1323, there is hereby retroceded to the United States
to be exercised concurrently with the jurisdiction of the State of
Alaska, measures of criminal jurisdiction on the Annette Islands
as was exercised by it immediately prior to the date of the enactment of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1958, (Pub. L. 85202
615) 72 Stat. 545.

Following referral to the Judiciary Committee, a committee substi203
tute was offered on March 25, which added an effective date. This
clause made the bill effective the day after its passage and approval
by the Governor, or the day it would become law without approval.
As amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee and reported back
204
on March 25, the bill passed the Senate on March 26 and the
205
House on April 4, both unanimously.
It was, however, vetoed by then-Governor Miller. The veto
message indicated that the Governor did not necessarily disagree

201. See S. 266, 6th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1969).
202. See id.
203. 1969 Alaska S. J. 457. The committee substitute changed the wording of
the new ALASKA STAT. § 12.05.020, but the changes were citational or grammatical, not substantive:
Subject to acceptance by the United States, as provided in Section 403 of
the Act of Congress of April 11, 1968; P.L. 90-284; 82 Stat. 79 (which
added 25 U.S.C., Sec. 1323), there is retroceded to the United States, to
be exercised concurrently with the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska,
such measures of criminal jurisdiction on the Annette Islands as were exercised by it immediately prior to the date of the enactment of the Act of
Congress of August 8, 1958 (Pub. L. 85-615) 72 Stat. 545 (which amended
18 U.S.C., Sec 1162 and 28 U.S.C., sec. 1360).
Alaska Comm. Substitute (Judiciary) for S. B. 266, 6th Leg., 1st Session (1969).
204. Id. The committee substitute added a section 2 (“This Act takes effect on
the day after its passage and approval or on the day it becomes law without approval”) and slightly reworded the new section 12.05.020 to read:
Jurisdiction of Annette Islands. Subject to acceptance by the United
States, as provided in Section 403 of the Act of Congress of April 11,
1968; PL 90-284; 82 Stat. 79 (which added 25 U.S.C., Sec. 1323), there is
retroceded to the United States, to be exercised concurrently with the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska, such measures of criminal jurisdiction
on the Annette Islands as were exercised by it immediately before the
enactment of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1958; P.L. 85-615; 72 Stat.
545 (which amended 18 U.S.C., Sec 1162 and 28 U.S.C., sec. 1360).
Comm. Substitute for S. B. No. 266 (6th Leg., 1st Sess.).
205. The bill passed 15-0 in the Senate and 39-0 in the House. 1969 Alaska S. J.
479 (March 26, 1969); 1969 Alaska H. J. 627 (April 4, 1969).
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with the bill’s goal, but thought that the bill would not achieve that
goal:
A careful study of the Federal law, under which retrocession was
to occur, revealed that the Bill does not accomplish its objective
because (1) only areas defined as Indian country qualify for retrocession of criminal jurisdiction to the Federal Government
under 25 U.S.C. 1323; and (2) according to the Case of United
States versus Booth, 17 Alaska 561, 161 F. Supp. 269 (Alaska
1958), the Annette Islands are not Indian country, within the
meaning of the pertinent Federal provisions. Thus, regardless of
the merits of the Bill’s objectives, present law appears to preclude the Federal Government
from accepting criminal jurisdic206
tion over the Annette Islands.

Although it seems anomalous today to consider Metlakatla as not
being Indian country, the law as of 1970 and the continued validity
vel non of the Booth opinion, were not clear. And, one cannot
otherwise fault the logic of the veto message: if Metlakatla was indeed not “Indian country,” then retrocession of jurisdiction would
be a legal impossibility, since Alaska’s jurisdiction over Metlakatla
would not be a function of PL 280 at all. Nor was this a problem
that a state legislative enactment could rectify; only the federal
government could specify whether a given area was “Indian country.”
Thus, Metlakatla had to go back to Congress. The important
point, however, is that the reason it had to go back to Congress was
not because of the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 itself, as that
particular aspect of the problem had already been solved. Assuming that PL 280 had stripped the tribe of all jurisdiction, the cooperation and acquiescence of the State of Alaska would suffice to
restore such jurisdiction. Rather, Metlakatla had to go back to
Congress because, if Booth was still good law and Metlakatla did
not occupy Indian country, the State could not retrocede anything

206. 1969 Alaska S. J. 833 (April 24, 1969). The Governor also expressed legal
hesitance that the State of Alaska could retain concurrent criminal jurisdiction
over “Indian country.” This concern was unfounded; it has since developed that
partial retrocession is permissible. See, e.g., Umatilla Indian Reservation; Oregon’s Acceptance of Retrocession of Jurisdiction, 46 Fed. Reg. 2195 (Jan. 8, 1981)
(retroceding criminal jurisdiction only). Further, even had it been the case that
Alaska had had to retrocede jurisdiction completely, it could have, with the consent of the people of Metlakatla, re-assumed partial jurisdiction over limited subject matter areas under the newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1321.
The Governor also expressed confusion over whether the federal government
could apply federal criminal statutes, while in the past the federal government had
applied territorial criminal statutes. This too seems to have been a secondary issue.
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under the 1968 amendments, since PL 280, both in its original 1958
version and its post-1968 version, would be irrelevant. Moreover,
only Congress could specify that the Annette Islands Reserve was
Indian country; this, and not the divestiture interpretation, was why
Metlakatla had to go back to Congress.
We now turn to the specifics of the 1970 Metlakatla Amendment itself. The following two sections analyze the amendment to
subsection (a) and to subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
V. THE METLAKATLA AMENDMENT
A. The 1970 Amendment and Subsection (a)
Listing Metlakatla as Indian country for purposes of PL 280
was not as simple as it might have first seemed. The legislative history indicates that Congress at least initially thought that the simplest solution would be to list Metlakatla as a reservation under 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a): “S. 902 . . . would give Metlakatla status similar to
that enjoyed by the Warm Springs Indians of Oregon and the Red
207
Lake Indians of Minnesota.”
But Metlakatla was not seeking status similar to those of
Warm Springs and Red Lake; within those two reservations, state
208
jurisdiction did not run at all. Metlakatla was not objecting to the
existence of Alaska’s jurisdiction, it was only objecting to the loss
of its own jurisdiction. As Metlakatla was now limited to imposing
prison sentences of six months or less by the Indian Civil Rights
209
Act, it is likely that both Metlakatla and the State of Alaska
would have objected to a provision that had the effect of stripping
the State of its jurisdiction entirely. Listing Metlakatla in the same
way that Warm Springs and Red Lake were listed would accomplish the goal of denominating Metlakatla as Indian country for the
207. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1545, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4785.
These are the two tribes listed as exceptions to the application of PL 280 in 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a). The Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin had originally been a third
exception, but was removed from that list in 1954.
208. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 810 (Alaska, 1999) (Matthews, J., dissenting):
On excepted reservations, such as Red Lake, the writ of state law under
PL 280 did not run. With respect to Metlakatla, Congress intended that
state law would continue to apply but that the Metlakatla Indian community would have concurrent jurisdiction over those offenses committed by
Indians which would be within the jurisdiction of tribes located in areas
where PL 280 does not apply.
209. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), amended by Pub. L. No. 909-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77.
This was amended in 1986 to allow for terms of up to one year. Pub. L. No. 99570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146.
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purposes of PL 280. However, this would have the unhappy consequences of shutting out the State from exercising criminal jurisdiction, and forcing the federal government to start exercising such jurisdiction over major offenses, a result not desired by Metlakatla,
Alaska, or the United States.
Metlakatla wanted to be listed as an area of Indian country
over which PL 280 was extended. However, the tabular structure
of section 1162(a) did not lend itself readily to that, as the only specifically named reservations were the exceptions, which PL 280 did
not reach. Thus, if Metlakatla was going to be named in the same
way as Red Lake and Warm Springs, some extra language would
be necessary in order to distinguish Metlakatla from those two reservations. To this end, the bill, as originally introduced, provided:
Alaska

All Indian country within the State, except that on
the Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community may exercise concurrently such jurisdiction as
was vested in it immediately prior to the date of enactment of the Act of August 8, 1958 (72 Stat.
210
545).

This language apparently led to concerns within the Departments of Justice and the Interior that Metlakatla’s jurisdiction prior
to 1958 might have exceeded the limits imposed as of 1968 by the
Indian Civil Rights Act. The Justice Department suggested that
the last clause be amended to read “as was vested in it prior to the
enactment of Public Law 85-615, subject to the provisions of title II
211
of Public Law 90-284.” The Interior Department suggested the
following language:
Alaska

All Indian country within the State, except that on
the Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community may exercise jurisdiction over the offenses
committed by Indians in the same manner in which
such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in
Indian country over which State jurisdiction has not
been extended and subject to the provisions of title
212
II of the act of April 11, 1968.

The elimination of the word “concurrent” in the Interior’s
proposed language from the original bill apparently raised concerns that this might make Metlakatla’s jurisdiction exclusive, but a
210. 116 CONG. REC. 32,585 (Sept. 18, 1970).
211. Letter from Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Hon. James O.
Eastland, Chair of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, included with H.R.
REP. NO. 91-1545, (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4787–88.
212. Letter from Fred J. Russell, Under Sec. of the Interior, to Hon. James O.
Eastland, Chairman of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, included with
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1545, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4768–87.
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letter from the Interior Department assured the Senate that its new
language would have the effect of allowing Metlakatla to exercise
concurrent jurisdiction:
The authority over minor crimes conferred on the Metlakatla
community by this bill will be concurrent with that authority exercised by the State of Alaska over Indian people living in the
Metlakatla community. The bill does not confer on the Metlakatla community exclusive jurisdiction over minor crimes
213
committed by its people on the reservation.

As enacted by the Senate, the bill included the Interior’s language but excluded the final clause referring to ICRA, as the Senate felt that compliance with ICRA should be understood and need
not be explicit:
Alaska

All Indian country within the State, except that on
the Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community may exercise jurisdiction over the offenses
committed by Indians in the same manner in which
such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in
Indian country 214
over which State jurisdiction has not
been extended.

This is the language that ultimately became law.215
It is necessary to acknowledge that the legislative history contains statements which suggest that Metlakatla had lost its jurisdic216
tion as a result of the extension of PL 280 to Alaska in 1958. As
such, even a superficial read of the legislative history would lead

213. Id. at 4787–88.
214. Loesch Letter, supra note 43:
On September 18, 1970, the Senate passed S. 902 with the Department’s
amendment, except that the last clause of that amendment, “and subject
to the provisions of Title II of the Act of April 11, 1968,” was deleted by
the Senate Judiciary Committee as being redundant. It was the opinion
of the Committee and the Senate that the phrase “. . . in the same manner in which such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian
country over which State jurisdiction has not been extended,” and the
wording of the Act of April 11, 1968 itself, would subject the Metlakatla
Indian Community to the provisions of that Act.
We are inclined to agree with that interpretation and would have no objection to House passage of the Senate modification of the Department’s
recommended amendment.
215. Almost unnoticed was the change from “[a]ll Indian country with the Territory” to “[a]ll Indian country within the State,” an acknowledgment, twelve
years after the fact, that Alaska was no longer a territory. The corresponding
change in the statute’s civil counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, was not made until
1984.
216. The legislative history also contains statements inconsistent with this divestiture interpretation, as discussed infra Part V.B. in the analysis of the amendment to subsection (c).
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one to the conclusion that Congress in 1970 was being told, as Metlakatla had been told, that PL 280 was the legal vehicle by which
Metlakatla had lost its jurisdiction. But the question is whether the
Metlakatla Amendment memorialized that belief into statutory
law, and the answer is that nothing in the amendment to subsection
(a) did so. The point is not that Congress believed that PL 280 left
tribes with concurrent jurisdiction, but rather that Congress did not
need to believe that PL 280 had stripped tribes of their jurisdiction
in order to see the necessity of amending subsection (a) to list Metlakatla. The divestiture question had become secondary as of 1970
because, in light of the 1968 amendments, any problem stemming
from a divestiture interpretation of PL 280 was remediable by an
agreement between Metlakatla and Alaska. What was not remediable was the supposed absence of Indian country in Metlakatla,
and the legislative history makes it clear that Congress recognized
the need to delineate Metlakatla as Indian country:
[W]e feel this language is needed in view of the position taken by
the State of Alaska in April of this year when Governor Miller
vetoed a bill passed by the legislature which would have retroceded certain criminal jurisdiction held by the State over Annette Islands to the Federal Government because the Annette
Islands are not Indian country
within the meaning of the perti217
nent Federal provisions.

The extra language surrounding Metlakatla’s place on the list was
necessary to distinguish it from Red Lake and Warm Springs. The
Interior Department suggested the following phraseology be included: “in the same manner in which such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian country over which State jurisdic218
tion has not been extended,” not to specify that Metlakatla had
had no jurisdiction prior to the amendment or to imply that concurrent state/tribal jurisdiction was the status quo in areas of Indian
country over which PL 280 did not reach, but rather to replace the
reference to Metlakatla’s pre-1958 jurisdiction (which might have
exceeded the limits of the Indian Civil Rights Act) with an analogy
to present-day tribal jurisdiction unaffected by PL 280 (which
would have to comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act).

217. Letter from Fred J. Russell, Under Sec. of the Interior, to Hon. James O.
Eastland, Chair of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 2, 1970), included with H.R. Rep. No. 91-1545 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783,
4787.
218. Id.
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B. The 1970 Amendment and Subsection (c)
The same amendment added ten words to the end of subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 1162. Before the amendment, the subsection
read:
The provision of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not
be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsec219
tion (a) of this section.

Following the amendment, subsection (c) read:
The provision of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not
be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which the several states have
220
exclusive jurisdiction.

The dissent in John v. Baker made the assumption that “exclusive”
must refer to “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction,” and thus concluded
that the addition of these words constituted explicit congressional
endorsement that PL 280 stripped tribes of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the natural question is whether this clause means “exclusive of
tribal jurisdiction” or “exclusive of federal sections 1152 and 1153
221
jurisdiction.”
It must be remembered that sections 1152 and 1153 are the
General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act, laws which create
jurisdiction for federal prosecutions in federal courts. This alone
indicates that Congress was addressing the demarcation between
state jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction, not that between state jurisdiction and tribal jurisdiction. In other words, in areas where PL
280 gave criminal jurisdiction to the states under subsection (a), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 should not apply to give concurrent criminal jurisdiction to the United States. Conversely, in those areas exempted from the application of PL 280 (i.e., Red Lake and Warm
Springs), sections 1152 and 1153 should apply so that major crimes,
outside the scope of state PL 280 jurisdiction and outside tribal
prosecutorial authority post-ICRA, can be federally prosecuted.

219. Loesch Letter, supra note 43.
220. Id.
221. Or, perhaps, “exclusive of both”; but the problems of interpreting it to
mean that prove to be the same as those analyzed infra accompanying an interpretation of “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.”
The more precise phrase “exclusive of federal sections 1152 and 1153 jurisdiction” is used rather than the simpler “exclusive of federal jurisdiction,” because
federal criminal laws of general applicability (i.e., defining crimes regardless of
where committed) remain in effect within Indian country regardless of 18 U.S.C. §
1162. See United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1164 (8th Cir. 1997).
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But the legislative history gives us a bit more insight than that.
As noted above, the reference in the original pre-1970 subsection
(c) to “the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this
section” was an ambiguous reference, in that there are two categories of Indian country listed in subsection (a)—those covered by PL
280 and those exempted. The awkwardness of fitting Metlakatla
into that list highlighted the list’s bifurcated nature. The motivation for the addition of the ten words—”as areas over which the
several states have exclusive jurisdiction”—was to clarify that, of
the two lists of Indian country in subsection (a), the list to which
sections 1152 and 1153 would not apply was the list to which PL
280 itself did apply: i.e., those areas where the states had jurisdiction under PL 280, to be exclusive under sections 1152 and 1153.
The ten words being added to subsection (c) seemed to take
the Interior Department by surprise; they had apparently not been
in the House Bill on which Interior had submitted its written comments in June 1970, and it was apparent that Interior would have
preferred that they not be in the Senate Bill either.
We also note that S. 902 as passed by the Senate contains a Section 2 which was not included in H.R. 6782 and which reads:
“Sec. 2. Subsection (c) of section 1162 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows: ‘(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable within
the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section
as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.’”
The italicized language is new. It is not discussed in the reports
on the bill submitted by this Department and by the Department
of Justice, nor in the reports of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, nor in any of the testimony, floor action, or
elsewhere in the background of the Senate S. 902. This Department’s report had, at least inferentially, recommended that Sec222
tion 2 be deleted from the bill.

The Interior Department’s concern led Senators Stevens, Gravel
and Ervin to write a reassuring letter to Rep. Celler, to whose
House Committee the Senate Bill was being referred following its
passage by the Senate:
It has come to our attention that the Department of the Interior
has raised a small question over the meaning of certain words in
S. 902, which is designed to permit the Metlakatla Indians of the
Annette Islands to have responsibility for maintaining law and
order in their own community. This question concerns the
meaning of the words “as areas over which the several states
have exclusive jurisdiction,” in section 2 of the bill.

222. Loesch Letter, supra note 43.
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This phrase adds new language to 18 United States Code
1162(c), which excludes the application of federal criminal provisions, sections 1152 and 1153, from those areas over which the
states have jurisdiction. The additional language is descriptive
only, and is not meant to change the meaning of 1162(c). It was
added because subsection (c) refers to the “Indian country listed
in subsection (a)” and that list includes Indian country not under
state jurisdiction, as well as areas that are. Obviously sections
1152 and 1153 are meant to apply to the former category. The
additional language is not intended to have any bearing on actual or potential arrangements between states and the tribes with
respect to the allocation of law enforcement responsibility between them.
While the additional language is perhaps unnecessary, it was
added for purposes of clarity. We believe it would be more confusing if the words were deleted at this late date in the legislative
process. We hope that this letter of explanation will obviate
any
223
problems which might further delay the passage of the bill.

This letter had apparently mollified the Interior Department:
As a result of discussions between representatives of this Department and the staffs of your committee and the corresponding Senate Committee, a letter was addressed to you on October
14, 1970, by Senators Ervin, Stevens and Gravel, the principal
sponsors and managers of S. 902. The letter explains that the
new language of 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) which would be added by
Section 2 of S. 902 was descriptive only, and was not intended to
change the meaning of § 1162(c) “nor to have any bearing on actual or potential arrangements between states and the tribes
which [sic] respect to the allocation of law enforcement authorities between them.”
With this understanding, which we interpret to mean that the
amendatory language will have no effect on whatever inherent jurisdiction particular Indian tribes have may retained in states
which were given or have assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Act
of August 8, 1958, 72 Stat. 545, as amended and supplemented by
Title II of the Act of April 11, 1968,
82 Stat. 77, we would not
224
object to House passage of S. 902.

There are two dimensions to the significance of these parts of
the legislative history. First, it is significant to note that the ten

223. Letter from Sens. Ted Stevens, Mike Gravel, and Sam J. Ervin Jr. to Hon.
Emanuel Celler, Chair of House Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 14, 1970), 115 CONG. REC.
37,354 & 37,355 (Nov. 16, 1970).
224. Loesch Letter, supra note 43 (emphasis added). The letters to Representative Celler from Assistant Secretary Loesch and from Senators Erwin, Gravel
and Stevens were included in the Congressional Record, and Representatitve
Donohue, in his remarks, re-affirmed the substance of the letter. 115 CONG. REC.
37,354 (Nov. 16, 1970).

01__HARRINGTON.DOC

46

6/5/2006 3:59 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[23:1

words were added not to have any implication for tribal authority,
but to clarify that sections 1152 and 1153 were to apply where PL
280 did not, and were not to apply where PL 280 did (more specifically, in those areas of Indian country within “mandatory” PL 280
states and not excepted from PL 280’s operation). In other words,
the ten words dealt with the demarcation between state jurisdiction
and federal jurisdiction, not between state jurisdiction and tribal
jurisdiction.
Second, it is even more significant that the legislative history
makes reference to “actual or potential arrangements between
states and the tribes with respect to the allocation of law enforcement authorities between them,” and “whatever inherent jurisdiction particular Indian tribes may have retained in states which were
225
given or have assumed jurisdiction pursuant to [PL 280].” Both
certainly imply residual tribal law enforcement authority. The
former could perhaps be explained as a function of the possibility
of state-tribal agreements under the 1968 amendment; but the latter directly posits that the Department of the Interior was contemplating that inherent jurisdiction could have survived the enactment of PL 280.
Such statements are clearly inconsistent with the notion that
the Department of the Interior was monolithically adhering to its
1954 position that there was no tribal jurisdiction within Indian
country covered by PL 280. As such, it cannot be said that Congress was ratifying that prior position when it enacted the 1970
amendment.
It appears that as of 1970, Interior was on the cusp of a dramatic shift in its view of the divestiture interpretation of PL 280.
The eventual 1978 Solicitor’s Opinion, which officially overruled its
prior divestiture pronouncements from 1954 and 1961, noted that
in 1976 “this office ha[d] already expressed the view that Pub. L.
280 did not divest Indian tribes of their part of the previouslyexisting concurrent Federal-tribal jurisdiction but transferred only
226
The Opinion further noted
Federal jurisdiction to the States.”
that even prior to the 1976 memorandum, the Interior Department’s actions had not always been consistent with the 1954 memorandum, including certification as far back as 1973 that several
227
tribes in PL 280 states were performing law and order functions.
Thus, the November 10, 1970 letter appears to have been an early
225. Id.
226. Solic. Mem. Op. M-36907, 6 INDIAN L. REP. H-1, H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978) (citing Solic. Mem. Op. (July 13, 1976).
227. Id. (referencing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
82 Stat. 197).
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harbinger of Interior’s 1973 certifications, its 1976 letter, and its ultimate 1978 recognition that PL 280 did not deprive tribes of inherent jurisdiction.
There is one further point to the analysis of subsection (c),
which starts by posing the question, did Congress intend that 18
U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 apply within Metlakatla?
The answer to that question is no. There is nothing in the text
or the legislative history of the 1970 amendment that would indicate that Congress wanted the General Crimes Act or the Major
Crimes Act to apply to Metlakatla. In fact, in the legislative history
one finds several inferences that Congress did not contemplate that
the amendment would allow enforcement of federal criminal laws
228
or require federal resources to be expended.
With that answer in mind, is it possible to interpret the term
“exclusive” in subsection (c) to mean “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction”? If so, that would mean that sections 1152 and 1153 do not
apply in areas where the state has jurisdiction “exclusive of tribal
jurisdiction.” Thus, since the state’s jurisdiction in Metlakatla is
clearly concurrent with, and not exclusive of, Metlakatla’s jurisdiction, sections 1152 and 1153 necessarily do apply within Metlakatla,
and jurisdiction over major crimes is shared between the state and
federal governments—directly contrary to what Congress intended.
If, however, “exclusive” in subsection (c) is interpreted to mean
“exclusive of federal [sections] 1152 and 1153 jurisdiction,” then
the state’s PL 280 jurisdiction within Metlakatla does meet that criterion, and sections 1152 and 1153 do not apply within Metlakatla,
229
consistent with congressional intent. Under that latter consistent
interpretation, the ten words in subsection (c) serve only to confirm
that PL 280 criminal jurisdiction in Alaska and other mandatory
PL 280 states is mutually exclusive with sections 1152 and 1153
criminal jurisdiction in the federal government, a logical result. It

228. H. Rep. No. 91-1545, Sep. 30, 1970, accompanying S. 902, reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4784 (“Authority over major criminal offenses in the Indian
community would remain exclusively with the State of Alaska”); 116 CONG. REC.
37,355 (Nov. 16, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Pollock) (“I should add in closing that,
according to the Interior Department report, the enactment of S. 902 will not generate any immediate need for Federal monetary assistance since prior to 1958,
Metlakatla was able to finance its law and order program exclusively from local
funds.”).
229. And, if the term “exclusive” in subsection (c) means exclusive of federal
and of tribal jurisdiction, then again, Metlakatla’s clearly concurrent jurisdiction
within the reservation means that Metlakatla doesn’t fit that criterion, so sections
1152 and 1153 apply, and Alaska’s jurisdiction in Metlakatla is exclusive of neither
tribal nor federal jurisdiction.
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may be argued that this is almost tautological; sections 1152 and
1153 are federal jurisdictional statutes, so the clause in subsection
(c) merely specifies that these federal jurisdictional statutes do not
apply in areas where state jurisdiction is exclusive of federal jurisdiction, a statement that is perhaps unnecessary. But this is entirely consistent with the observation in the legislative history that
“while the clause is perhaps unnecessary, it is added for purposes
230
of clarity.”
Moreover, the conundrum created by interpreting “exclusive”
in subsection (c) to mean “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction” only
worsens when one considers that all other Indian country affected
by PL 280 is effectively in the same position as Metlakatla (i.e., jurisdiction is shared by the tribe and the corresponding state government). Thus, if “exclusive” in subsection (c) does mean exclusive of tribal jurisdiction, then sections 1152 and 1153 apply in all
such areas, and in fact everywhere that PL 280 applies. With such a
reading, the original “unfunded mandate” purpose of PL 280, replacing federal prosecution with state prosecution, fails entirely.
Of course, it might be argued by some that, in all other areas
of Indian country outside Metlakatla, the state, tribal and federal
courts have been in error in concluding that state and tribal jurisdiction is concurrent. Indeed, if they were to reach the opposite
conclusion, the word “exclusive” in subsection (c) could mean “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction” without creating a logical inconsistency. But that would still leave the conundrum within Metlakatla
itself; the legislative intent to create concurrent jurisdiction between Metlakatla and the State of Alaska is so clear that it is impossible to assert that Alaska’s jurisdiction within Metlakatla is
231
“exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.” Thus, one is ineluctably led to
the paradoxical result that sections 1152 and 1153 have to apply
232
within Metlakatla, contrary to Congress’ clear intent, if “exclusive” in subsection (c) means “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.”

230. Letter from Sens. Ervin, Gravel and Stevens to Hon. Emanuel Celler,
Chair, House Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 14, 1970), 116 CONG. REC. 37,354–55 (Nov.
16, 1970).
231. “With respect to Metlakatla, Congress intended that state law would continue to apply but that the Metlakatla Indian community would have concurrent
jurisdiction . . . .” John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 810 (Alaska 1999) (Matthews, J.,
dissenting).
232. “Authority over major criminal offenses in the Indian community would
remain exclusively with the State of Alaska. It was emphasized at the hearing that
while the State authorities would be required to handle major offenses under the
proposed amendment just as it does now, this legislation would meet a very real
need . . . .” 116 CONG. REC. 37,354 (Nov. 16, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Pollock).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is correct that the Interior Department in June
1970 expressed the view to Congress that PL 280 had stripped Metlakatla of its jurisdiction, it is incorrect to conclude that this interpretation was codified into statutory law by the 1970 Metlakatla
Amendment. First, the 1970 amendment was not necessitated by
the question of whether PL 280 had divested Metlakatla of all jurisdiction, as Congress had already (through its 1968 amendments)
given Alaska and Metlakatla the tools necessary to adjust the jurisdictional division between them regardless of the original divestiture issue. Rather, it was necessitated by the fact that only the federal government could designate Metlakatla as Indian country to
overcome the Booth decision. Second, the Interior Department
did not consistently adhere to its June 1970 position that PL 280 divested tribes of all jurisdiction and, in its correspondence relating
to the change in subsection (c), took the view as early as November
1970 (prior to passage of the amendment) that PL 280 might leave
room for residual concurrent tribal jurisdiction (which view was repeated by members of Congress at the time the amendment bill
was passed). Third, the addition of the term “exclusive” to subsection (c) was intended to mean “exclusive of federal sections 1152
and 1153 jurisdiction,” not “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.” In fact,
the opposite interpretation leads to a result clearly contrary to congressional intent.
Thus, the 1970 amendment did not transform Interior’s previous and now-disavowed divestiture interpretation into codified law;
the wording chosen by Congress is entirely consistent with the nondivestiture interpretation subsequently adopted by all of the PL
280 states that have considered the issue. The amendment left the
Interior Department with the same capacity it had had prior to that
amendment to reconsider and ultimately repudiate its previous interpretation, which it eventually did.
If and when the time does come for the Alaska Supreme Court
to address the issue left unresolved by C.R.H. (i.e., whether the
concurrent jurisdiction which the court has recognized exists between state and tribal courts over tribal members outside Indian
country has been abrogated within Indian country by PL 280), the
1970 Metlakatla Amendment should not present an analytical obstacle to reaching the correct resolution.

